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1. Introduction 
 
“We now witness a situation in which liberals and radicals, disappointed 
by the performance of the state in Africa, are united in proclaiming civil 
society as the most viable alternative to the failed state. In civil society, 
it is now claimed, lie not only the prospects of democracy, but also the 
prospects of a regime that will respect human rights. The prognosis is 
that the state is bad while everything outside it is good“ (Moyo1 1993: 
4). 
 
Since the early 1990s the concept of civil society has come to the center stage of attention. 
Academics and development agencies are equally celebrating its invaluable positive 
contribution to promoting democracy in countries throughout the globe.  This has been a 
welcomed and important insight, not at least in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa where an 
increasing number of states have been denoted as ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’, broadly speaking due to 
their inabilities of living up to the standards of the westerns states (e.g. Rotberg). Exactly due 
to the disappointment with the performance of the African state and in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the authoritarian states of the Soviet Union, the concept of civil society has been 
reinvented after a long period of absence in the academia. It is believed that civil society will 
be the mean through which it will finally be possible to deal with the authoritarian African 
states. In other words, while the state is playing the part of the bad guy, civil society is seen as 
the hero that will eventually win (e.g. Lewis 2001; Kasfir 1998). Civil society in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is generally considered to be weak and consequently the conventional wisdom is to 
make it stronger.  
While the future of Zimbabwe after the independence in 1980 looked rather promising, this 
development has dramatically changed. Throughout the past decades Zimbabwe has gone 
through an escalating crisis, with an economy in free fall; including world record high inflation 
rates until the Zimbabwean currency was finally replaced by the US dollar in 2009 and anno 
2010 with GDP per capita estimated to be the same as in 1953. Needless to say, the immense 
economic crisis has also had severe social consequences. Schools have collapsed, major 
                                                           
1
 Jonathan Moyo is a rather controversial character in Zimbabwean politics. He holds a bachelor degree in Public 
Policy and a master degree in Public Administration from the University of Southern California. He started 
playing a part in Zimbabwean politics when he was headhunted to be the spokesperson of the committee finishing 
the draft constitution for the referendum in 2000. From 2000 to 2005 he served as the ZANU-PF minster of 
Information until he was expelled from ZANU-PF. In the US he is considered an obstacle towards 
democratization of Zimbabwe (BBC 2005). In spite of this controversial background, we have decided to bring the 
quote as the very first thing in the paper because we think that the quote is more telling and makes a precise 
statement about the large body of writing of civil society literature and the reasoning behind it, than it is an 
expression of the disputed character and loyalties of Jonathan Moyo.       
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hospitals have faced shortages on even the most basic materials and the unemployment rate and 
the population living below poverty line are both estimated to be around 80 percent by the IMF 
(Zeilig 2010). The crisis has led several scholars to use the failed state label to describe the 
current situation (Brett 2005; Ndlovu - Gatsheni 2007). This label implies that the once so 
strong authoritarian state currently seems to be losing its firm grip of Zimbabwe.  
In the context of this failing authoritarian state, this is exactly where civil society should come 
in and take center stage according to the conventional wisdom. Though mainstream scholars of 
civil society generally agree on the positive effects of civil society, the evaluation of the 
concrete existence of and performance by civil society in Zimbabwe is less optimistic. Some 
critical voices claim that the concept of civil society  is not applicable in the context of Africa, 
whereas others claim that civil society in Zimbabwe is there but that it is currently weak or 
even failing. 
 
1.1 Research Field 
 
In this paper we will address the Zimbabwean civil society and their prospects of contributing 
to a democratic development. Doing so, we will primarily be looking back on civil society in 
general and specifically on two civil society organizations after the Zimbabwean independence 
in 1980, to see first whether and how it makes sense to talk about a civil society there, and 
secondly, to what extent this civil society has so far been promoting democracy. We shall argue 
that the reality that all Zimbabwean civil society organizations face, is that their destiny is to 
certain extends decided from its relation to the state. This is apparent in the dilemma sharply 
put by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum: “to engage or not engage with the 
government of Zimbabwe” (Zeilig 2010).  
The examination however, will not only include empirical studies; these will be entangled with 
a critical assessment of the theories of the concept of civil society, its relevance in an African 
context and the supposed relationship between civil society and the promotion of democracy. 
According to Michael Bratton: “all too often the concept of civil society is used unreflectively” 
(Bratton 1994: 2). By depicting some of the nuances of civil society in Zimbabwe, we shall 
avoid doing the same mistake. We shall aim at problematizing the mainstream understandings 
of civil society as something that can be described with homogeneous labels, such as civil 
society being solely ‘the good guys’ and African civil society being generally ‘weak’. This is of 
particular interest, because the concept of civil society has its origins in the western world and, 
as will be argued, is seemingly failing to grasp some of the main features and differences of the 
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current context in Zimbabwe. This mistake has been noted by scholars who alternatively then, 
call the concept of civil society non-applicable in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
Arguably, one of the main mistakes is the assumption that the state and the civil society are two 
distinct concepts, hereby not recognizing the interdependence (Berger 2002: 25-27). Applying 
the concept of civil society in an African context, civil society has been expected to be the 
oppositional force towards the substantially undemocratic states, hereby implicitly making the 
state the problem and civil society the solution – per se. As genuine and fair as this 
classification might sound in the specific case of Mugabe’s authoritarian state, this perspective 
leaves no room for pluralism and variation. Thus, one fails to recognize for example, that civil 
society might as well consist of alternative centers of power that are not necessarily democratic 
and that the faith of the state and of civil society is not determined autonomously but is 
essentially depending on the other.    
When evaluating the situation of Zimbabwean civil society without noticing that some of the 
premises for the western derived concept are fundamentally different, in the Zimbabwean case, 
one fails to grasp the nuances of the Zimbabwean reality. This difference should not suggest 
that the concept of civil society is irrelevant. Rather, we suggest drawing on the western 
conceptualization exactly with the aim of showing the differences in the premises across 
contexts; we find that the particular relationship between Mugabe’s authoritarian state and the 
Zimbabwean civil society more than anything tells the story about the nation of Zimbabwe.   
Applying the conceptions of civil society and democracy on our Zimbabwean case it further 
appears that the concept of civil society has vital gaps in explaining the concrete ways through 
which civil society will actually promote a democratic development. While the presence and 
action of civil societies in industrialized societies of the West might strengthen already well- 
functioning democracies, it makes little sense to expect that civil societies in African de facto 
non democratic systems will have the same influence. Civil society and the state are mutually 
dependent, so when the strong authoritarian state does not approve of democracy and does not 
allow civil society to operate, it is not likely that civil society will have the same positive 
effects. To put it differently; whereas the tasks of western civil societies are to contribute to a 
democratic culture then the task of for example the Zimbabwean civil society is to change the 
structures of an essentially non democratic society. We recommend to recognize the different 
contextual circumstances and to adjust the vision of the contribution of civil society 
accordingly.          
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It follows from the above that this paper will be challenging the mainstream conceptions of 
civil society and democratization by pointing to certain limits that are appearing when applying 
it to the Zimbabwean context; we argue that there is a need to clarify some of the blurriness of 
the concept. Attempting to do so, we shall not just assume that civil society is inevitably related 
to the promotion of democracy. Civil society in its basic form can exist, yet that does not equal 
a compulsory promotion of democracy. We will argue that there is a need to distinguish the 
theoretical conceptions of civil society in its most basic form, from the visions on how civil 
society organizations ought to act. If the concept of civil society is simply dismissed as 
inapplicable to a certain context, merely because the actors there are not contributing to 
democracy, one fails to grasp the vital mechanisms of the society.  
We will approach this, first by outlining the mainstream theories of civil society. This will be 
done by providing an overview of the history as well as the main controversies and debates, 
especially in regards to the relationship between civil society and democracy and in terms of 
the relevance of the concept in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. We will then continue our 
examination by dividing the basic conceptions of what civil society is, from conceptions of 
civil society promoting democracy. Hence, in chapter 5 we will look into whether the 
conception of civil society is applicable and useful in the context of Zimbabwe. Following, in 
chapter 6, we shall then examine whether it makes sense to talk about Zimbabwean civil 
society promoting democracy, from whichever forms it exists in. 
Examining whether the concept of civil society is applicable will be done through a mapping of 
some of the big organizations that by some scholars are denoted as civil society and through an 
assessment of the circumstances in where these organizations are acting. We are not aiming to 
provide a complete mapping nor to give an in-depth account of all details but merely to 
highlight the main tendencies that appear to be among these organizations and the environment 
where they act in.  
Looking into whether it makes sense to talk about a per se relation between civil society and 
democracy, we are using two different cases, respectively the National Constitutional 
Assembly (NCA) and the war veteran’s biggest association, the Zimbabwe National Liberation 
War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). Though they arguably share the basic characteristic of 
being civil society organizations, there are also differences in their characteristics that lead to 
different expectations to their promotion of democracy.   The NCA represents a case of an 
organization that is explicitly aiming at promoting democracy and that has had some success in 
putting this issue on the agenda in Zimbabwe. Conversely, the ZNLWVA exemplifies an 
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organization whose contribution to democracy is more questionable. These cases lead us into a 
broader discussion of the link between civil society and democracy.       
Our studies will be focusing mainly on the period after independence in 1980. However, it is 
crucial to note that the Zimbabwean nation is still young and that it is deeply marked by 
patterns from the colonial period. In order to understand the current nature and mechanisms of 
the Zimbabwean reality, it is therefore important to begin with a brief introduction of the main 
lines of the Zimbabwean history. Furthermore, when considered relevant throughout the paper, 
we will be drawing on historical data in order to provide the reader with a better approximation 
of the full picture.    
1.1.1 Research Question 
As follows from the above our research question is:  
“Is the concept of civil society applicable in Zimbabwe and do the NCA and the ZNLWVA as 
civil society organizations promote democracy?” 
1.1.2 Sub Questions 
We have had the following sub questions guiding our research: 
• What are the mainstream understandings and debates of the concept of civil society? 
• What is the relationship between civil society and democracy? 
• Which organizations are scholars mainly referring to as those of civil society in the 
 context of Zimbabwe and what are their characteristics? 
• In what environment do these organizations act and how does that affect them? 
• How does the NCA promote democracy? 
• How is the ZNLWVA not promoting democracy? 
• Should the ZNLWVA be considered part of civil society? 
• What are the implications of the lessons from the NCA and the ZNLWVA for the
  presumed link between civil society and democracy? 
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2. Methodology 
 
In this chapter we will be clarifying the methodologies of the paper. We will first provide an 
outline of the main topics of each of the chapters. Then, we will specify our research strategy 
as well as our considerations concerning data collection and our theoretical framework. 
Following this, will be a note on our delimitations and finally, the chapter will include some 
clarification of key concepts in the paper.      
2.1 Outline of Project 
Overall, the paper is divided into 8 chapters. The conclusion is derived on the basis of the first 
six chapters.  
Chapter 1 is an introduction to the thematic as well as the research field, the research question 
and the sub questions of the paper.  
Chapter 2 presents the basic methodologies of the project. 
Chapter 3 serves as an introduction to Zimbabwe, including the main lines of the history and 
an introduction to the vital actors in relation to civil society, ZANU-PF and the MDC.  
Chapter 4 starts with providing an overview of the historical development of the concept of 
civil society. This is followed by an introduction to the current understandings of civil society, 
including the relationship between civil society and democracy and its use in development 
policies. Finally, the chapter includes a brief overview of the key controversies and debates 
around the concept, most specifically in relation to the use of the concept in the context of Sub-
Saharan Africa.    
Chapter 5 aims at answering the first part of our research question, that is, whether the concept 
of civil society is applicable in the context of Zimbabwe. Answering the question we are 
drawing on the empirical knowledge from chapter 3 and the theoretical conceptions from 
chapter 4. On this basis we are providing a mapping of what some scholars refers to as 
Zimbabwean civil society and an introduction to the scenario in which these organizations are 
operating. These phenomena and circumstances will be analyzed in order to see whether and 
how it makes sense to talk about a civil society in Zimbabwe.        
Chapter 6 includes the case studies of respectively the NCA and the ZNLWVA in order to 
answer the second part of our research question, namely if these organizations are promoting 
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democracy in Zimbabwe. Following the case studies, the implications of our findings for the 
presumed link between civil society and democracy will be discussed.      
Chapter 7 serves as the conclusion where we will be summing up and answering both parts of 
our research question.  
Chapter 8 is offering some perspectives derived from the conclusions drawn and offers policy 
implications and suggestions for further research.  
 
2.2 Research Strategy 
The focus of the paper is inspired from the mandatory course on ‘Globalization, Political 
Culture, Civil Society and Social Movements’. The framework of this course has also served as 
our point of departure; namely the 1990s new focus on organized civil society in development 
as a response to the perceived failure of state led development approaches. More specifically, 
in line with the course our paper explores the relations of power that are contributing to 
processes of social change in the context of a central state. On a more theoretical level we are 
inspired by and have critically assessed the emergence of the concept of civil society and 
specifically the current ‘romanticized’ ideas of the positive contributions of it, that are 
implicitly excluding potential ‘bad guys’ or what is sometimes denoted as ‘uncivil’ society 
from the conception.2 
Concretely, in examining the NCA and the ZNLVWA we are conducting two case studies. The 
advantage of case studies is that is allows us to investigate our topic in-depth within its context 
(Yin 2003).  The two cases are chosen on the background of their apparent similarities as civil 
society organizations in the same context, but with their different histories and aims leading to 
different expectations of their contributions to democracy. The exploratory case study is known 
for that, “it may follow intuitive paths” (Yin 2003: 6). The goal is to identify questions and 
develop hypotheses for the use in sub-sequent often large scale studies in cases where the area 
initially is characterized by uncertainty (Yin 2003).         
 
As the focus of the paper and the research question is rather abstract and complex, we have 
developed a research strategy that allows us to contextualize the phenomena of our research. It 
has served as important point of departure to acquire a broader understanding of the 
Zimbabwean context, in terms of acquiring an insight in the crucial events and actors that serve 
                                                           
2
 The course literature that has served as basic information is included in the syllabus in the bibliography at the 
end of the paper.    
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as main elements in the environment from which civil society should be understood. We have 
gained knowledge about our cases through induction, however, the conclusions we reach, are 
drawn through theoretical discussions of the empirical observations we have made. In other 
words, the phenomena that we observe empirically, through our mapping and our two case 
studies, serve as an offset to understand the broader mechanisms and relations of civil society 
in Zimbabwe.  
From this research strategy it follows that we are not aiming at generating scientific ‘truths’. 
Rather, our aim is to provide a conclusion based on rational, critical reasoning from the results 
we have estimated through our case studies. We hope that this reasoning and the conclusions 
we draw, will inspire for further scientific research in the grey zone of the idea of a relationship 
between civil society and democratization in an African context.   
 
2.3 Data Collection 
When conducting case studies, data can be collected from various sources. Conclusions can be 
made on this background, as there are no strict guidelines about the collection of data (Bryman 
2004; Yin 2003). Collecting data we have aimed at triangulation, meaning that the data we use 
is confirmed from more than one source and that we have found no contradicting evidence.  
For secondary literature, we have aimed at relying on work from the scholars that are 
commonly referred to in publications on context of the Zimbabwe. On top, we have prioritized 
the contributions of scholars that are Zimbabwean themselves and as such, must have a first-
hand understanding of the Zimbabwean reality. Among the most prominent ones that fit both of 
these mentioned requirements are Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopoulos. It should be noted 
that the Zimbabwean context is characterized by polarization between those being in favor of 
and those being against ZANU-PF (Chikwengo 09.12.2010) which could mean that the 
Zimbabwean scholars have a stake in the situation.  As such, that their contributions could be 
characterized by certain biases. We however, consider their high levels of education and the 
broad acknowledgment of their work as confirmation for these biases being minimal and we 
rather appreciate their in-depth knowledge of the context.  
Furthermore, we have strived towards getting as much first-hand knowledge as possible. This 
have among other means, been done through Zimbabwean news sources such as 
NewZimbabwe and through documents from the civil society organizations themselves. The 
last ambition has however, proved rather difficult in some cases. First of all, numerous of the 
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most prominent civil society organizations do not have homepages and among those who do, 
only a few of them have been updated in the past year.3 It is probably no coincidence that the 
amount of updated material is limited but rather the result of the restricted environment that the 
Zimbabwean civil society organizations are operating in.  We will elaborate further on this 
point, in the special case of the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (ZLP) in section 2.5.                 
In the process of developing and specifying the focus of the paper we have had an  informal 
talk with Amanda Hammar. Amanda Hammar is herself Zimbabwean and holds among other 
things a Ph.D. in International Development Studies in the topic of land, authority and 
belonging in Zimbabwe. She is currently a MSO professor at the Center of African Studies 
(CAS) in Copenhagen.  Amanda has been very helpful in assisting us with getting an overview 
of the Zimbabwean civil society and in discussing the concept of civil society and 
democratization in relation to the Zimbabwean reality. Furthermore, she has kindly provided us 
with contact information for Brian Raftopoulos, Zimbabwean and one of the main scholars 
working on the social, economic and political development of Zimbabwe. She has furthermore 
provided us with the contact information for a key figure in the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 
(ZLP)4. Through email correspondence, this key figure has shared opinions and provided us 
with information and documents on the ZLP which proved difficult to acquire otherwise, as we 
shall return to in section 2.5. 
 
In order to get a further impression of the reality experienced by the Zimbabwean civil society, 
we have attended an MS Action Aid Conference on civil society and democratization in 
Zimbabwe. The main speaker was Dadirai Chikwengo, former key figure in the NCA around 
the constitution process in the late 1990s and current chairperson of the National Association 
for NGO’s (NANGO).  The conference was arranged on request from the Danish Foreign 
Ministry as the ‘warm up’ for a Zimbabwe donor meeting in the ministry the day after the 
conference and as such, it needs to be taken into consideration that Dadirai had a certain ‘donor 
focus’. Nevertheless, her presentation was useful in giving us an idea of the line of thinking for 
the part of Zimbabwean civil society that considers itself as the opposition to the state. 
 
 
                                                           
3
 As examples, neither of the war veterans organizations have their own homepage. For examples of not updated 
civil society organization homepages we among others refer to Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU).    
4
 We have decided to keep the identity anonymous.  
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2.4  Theoretical Framework 
Due to the theoretical parts of our focus, we have found it crucial to create an overview of the 
development and the tendencies in the literature on the concept of civil society, rather than 
simply going into depth with a few scholars. This overview will be presented in chapter 4. Here 
will draw the historical lines back to scholars that were among the first to bring attention to 
what later has earned the label of civil society, such as T. Hobbes and J. Locke. We will 
continue following the historical path and the most acknowledged contributors, by coming 
across the work from e.g. A. De Tocqueville and A. Gramsci, continuing until recent days’ 
primary contributions from for among others R. Putnam and L. Diamond.  These historical 
lines are drawn in order to make the baseline and the most adequate contextualization of the 
theoretical field within which the current discussions are taking place and to which we shall get 
to introduce. Having provided this theoretical baseline, we will continuously introduce more 
theoretical points throughout the paper in order to make the foundation for concluding on the 
basis of the empirical observations.   
 
2.5 Delimitations 
An important part of the Zimbabwean civil society are the traditional local smaller scale 
groupings that are very different from what we know in the West, such as woman saving clubs 
and burial societies. Though the paper is about the applicability of the concept of civil society 
in Zimbabwe, we are not including this kind of civil society in our examinations.  We do 
acknowledge the immense role that this part of civil society might be playing. However, due to 
our limits of not conducting field research it has been too complicated to acquire sufficient 
information.    
When looking at the war veterans we are merely focusing at the ZNLWVA. Doing so, it should 
still be acknowledged that in 2000 one fraction broke away and created the ZLP.  The 
motivation for the breakaway was according to our anonymous source, the concern and 
disapproval of the power abuse and violation of human rights from some of the war veterans. 
In contradiction to the ZNLWVA, the explicit aim of the ZLP is “the democratisation5 of 
Zimbabwe in fulfilment of the unfinished liberation agenda” (ZLP Vision Statement). The fact 
of the split from the ZNLWVA and the aim of the ZLP unquestionably make them a rather 
                                                           
5ZLP defines democracy as follows: “True democracy is founded on and characterized by full consultation, 
participation, and involvement of all stakeholders in decision making processes on matters that affect people’s 
livelihoods and the well-being and fate of the nation. It is permeated by total accountability to the people, the 
repository of political power, from beginning to end and has as its heart and soul, the full respect for civil liberties 
and democratic values and the dignity of the human being” (ZLP Vision Statement). 
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interesting case, though it has proved rather difficult to acquire information. In the email 
correspondence with our anonymous source the reason for these difficulties could be found. 
According to our source, state agents attempted to destroy the ZLP in the period from 2004 and 
2007. Anonymous claims that this was done through arresting of the ZLP management and 
stripping the ZLP off all its assets, among other things vehicles, office furniture and equipment, 
including computers. Due to the harassment the ZLP has currently neither funding nor 
resources, which has managed to paralyse the organizations activities and capacities 
(Anonymous 2010). This analysis does seemingly explain why it is almost impossible to find 
any recent information about the ZLP and does yet again make the case more interesting. 
However, as the correspondence is the only information we have, we have found ourselves 
forced to leave the ZLP out as focus area in the analysis, simply due to the absence of sufficient 
information. Though the ZLP will not be directly the subject for analysis, we do refer to them 
frequently in order to provide a better understanding of the case of the ZNLWVA.    
2.5 Conceptual Clarifications 
In this section we will clarify some of the key concepts of our paper.  
State: When referring to the state we understand it as the organizing entity within a country. It 
includes not only decision making organs but also the bureaucracy and further executing 
institutions. In the case of Zimbabwe it is important to note that it is not possible to make any 
clear distinctions between the state, the government and the ruling party, ZANU-PF. Therefore, 
we will be referring to these three entities interchanging. We will elaborate further on the 
difficulties of this distinction in chapter 3 and chapter 5.    
Civil society: A phenomenon most basically understood as actors or the sphere beyond the 
household and outside the state. We will discuss and elaborate on our understanding of civil 
society in further details throughout the paper.  
Democracy:  When considering the relationship between civil society and democracy 
throughout the paper, it will be understood in line with mainstream western scholars, unless we 
explicitly claim to use it differently. We understand democracy as a political system as well as 
a culture, characterized among other things by free and fair elections, rule of law, guarantied 
basic freedom rights to all citizens, checks and balances, participation, an opposition and a free 
media. Altogether, we consider democracy a system that is built on a minimum of coercion and 
a maximum of consent. The list of characteristics mentioned can be present in various forms 
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and to different extends. This implies that we see democracy as a constant work in progress 
that never reaches its final stage.   
 
3. Introduction to the Case of Zimbabwe 
 
 
In this chapter we shall be looking into the case of Zimbabwe in more detail, in order to better 
understand the context in which the Zimbabwean civil society is operating. We shall do so by 
accounting for the main lines in the Zimbabwean history and the current situation. Furthermore, 
we shall introduce the main actors in relation to civil society, Zimbabwe African National Union 
– Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).    
3.1 Overview  
 
Today’s nation state of Zimbabwe is situated in southern Africa, neighbouring the countries 
South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana. It consists of 8 provinces and 2 cities with 
provincial status, of which one is the capital Harare. The at least on the paper existing 
parliamentary democracy of Zimbabwe has since 1980 been led by the President Robert 
Gabriel Mugabe and his party ZANU-PF (CIA Factbook 2010).  
In the years succeeding independence in 1980 the country’s future was looking promising. The 
government achieved partially economic and social gains which were shown in an economic 
growth of 12 percent and significant advancement in the educational and health sector. In 
addition the infrastructure was improved and jobs created (Muzondidya 2009: 168; 
Sachikonye 2002). However, the wind turned with the economic decline in the 1990s and led 
amongst other factors at the beginning of 2000 to the economic, social and political “Crisis in 
Zimbabwe” (Raftopoulos 2009: 201). Today Zimbabwe’s government (ZANU-PF) is famous 
for its repression of the opposition (MDC) and the state is often labelled as “failing”. To add to 
the factors outlined in the introduction, life expectancy is estimated to be around 47, 5 years, 
15 percent of the population are HIV positive and the country’s GDP is on the 166th position in 
the worldwide ranking. Furthermore, Zimbabwe is rated not free by the Freedom House index, 
with a score of 6 in political and civil liberties rights (Freedom House 2010). Because of these 
conditions people are leaving the country in search for better livelihoods heading towards 
South Africa, Botswana and the UK (CIA Factbook 2010). 
As a result of the 2008 elections, the MDC and ZANU-PF formed a ‘power-sharing’ 
agreement. Although there were no agreements upon governmental issues yet, and in spite of 
the threat that the opposition forces will boy-cutting the upcoming elections, the measures 
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taken to improve the economic situation and constrain the hyperinflation has showed the first 
results (CIA Factbook 2010).  
3.2 History of Zimbabwe 
 
Since it is not possible to do justice to the Zimbabwean history on a few pages, the focus of the 
following chapter will be on the colonial and postcolonial past of today’s nation of Zimbabwe 
without going deeper into the pre-colonial era. 
Zimbabwe’s pre-colonial history is often described as the rise and fall of powerful empires like 
Great Zimbabwe, the Mutapa, the Torwa, the Rozwi and Ndebele states, a view which is 
supported by Mugabe because it suits his political agenda.6 This perception is criticised by 
some scholars because of its misleading notion that implies the significance of empires and 
ignores that the majority of the people lived and, therefore thought, in smaller units. From this 
should be noted that even when ethnic groups are mentioned, they seldom actually were 
homogenous units (Raftopoulos & Mlambo 2009: xviii f.).  
For example the term “Shona” implies that certain people had a common identity due to 
linguistic, cultural and political characteristics but until the 19th century they did not identify 
with that name and even afterwards referred to “Karanga”, “Hole” etc. (Raftopoulos & 
Mlambo 2009: xviiif.).  “Shona” was in fact an insult used by the enemies for the population 
that inhabited the area larger than today’s Zimbabwean territory, stretching into South Africa, 
Zambia and Mozambique. The region was characterized by a ceaseless flow and exchange of 
goods, ideas and people with different groups and states (Mazarire 2009: 2f.). In the early 19th 
century migrants from the south of the Limpopo passed through, or settled like the Ndebele 
and Gaza and formed states (Mazarire 2009: 31).  
The first Europeans to establish a presence in the region were the Portuguese in 1506. In 1569 
and 1577 they tried to invade the Mutapa state. In 1629 the state was mortgaged to the 
Portuguese crown but especially with the discovery of gold other colonial powers; namely the 
British and the Afrikaners, became interested in the plateau region (Mazarire 2009: 17; 31). In 
1893 the Ndebele fought the British in the Anglo-Ndebele War and in 1896-1897 the Shona 
and Ndebele joint forces in the first Chimurenga7 in order to fight against interventions by the 
early colonial rule. They were finally defeated and the British became the dominating colonial 
                                                           
6
 In 1977 he published an article stating that throughout the history the Shona “nation” situated in today’s 
boundaries of the Zimbabwean state, had to fight invaders in order to keep its autonomy (Raftopoulos & Mlambo 
2009: xviii). 
7
 This term refers to a lineage of wars against settler rule in Zimbabwe (Alexander 2006: 185). 
-   Civil Society in Zimbabwe: “To Engage or not to Engage With the State”   -  
 
- 14 -  
power (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 39). In 1898 the construction of a settler colony began and the 
territory was called Rhodesia. A colonial state was created that institutionalized the separation 
of the settlers and the indigene in matters of the economy, political system and law. The white 
minority established the system of “indirect rule” in order to rule over the African majority 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 58f.). Additionally, a spatial segregation was enforced. For that 
purpose most Africans were removed to reserves and the land was distributed to white settlers. 
This system resembled the South African Apartheid (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 66). 
The involvement in the world wars and the industrialisation in Rhodesia had far-reaching 
consequences in matters of demography and social and political transformations. A growing 
urban population and the rise of a well-educated African middle – class, combined with an 
increasing political consciousness changed the attitude towards colonial rule from wanting fair 
governance to demanding self-rule (Mlambo 2009: 75; 85).  
By the time that Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence (UDI) in 1965, a major 
African nationalist movement had been formed. In 1963 it split into two groups which were 
officially banned in 1964, the ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and the ZAPU 
(Zimbabwe African People’s Union) (Mlambo 2009: 111f.). Most members of the leadership 
were imprisoned or driven into exile. 
After the UDI, the government faced sanctions and a consequence was growing economic 
problems. These problems resulted in the reorganisation of the economy. However, they failed 
to provide for the needs of the African population, hence leading towards an even more uneven 
development (Mtisi et al. 2009a: 140).  
The following years were marked by guerrilla war and anti-colonial struggle. In the late 1970s 
the cost of war and external pressure lay heavily on the Rhodesian government which in 1979 
agreed to sign the Lancaster House Conference Agreement. This meant that the new elected 
government inherited debts of about 200 Million dollars plus pensions for all former Rhodesian 
civil servants and was not allowed to expropriate unused white property. Furthermore, the 
liberation forces had to be integrated into the army and 20 out of 100 parliamentary seats had 
to be retained for whites for a period of at least seven years. The elections resulted in the 
majority of the Zimbabweans voting for ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe; becoming the first 
Zimbabwean Prime Minister (Mtisi et al. 2009b: 165f.).  
The new government faced multiple challenges regarding nation-building, economy, unequal 
distribution of wealth and access to infrastructure and services. At first it seemed that the 
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government made progress and the economy boosted but unemployment grew and throughout 
the 1980s the state’s capacity to finance its programmes declined.  In addition, the gap between 
rich and poor did not become narrower (Muzondidya 2009: 168-171).  Besides the ruling 
ZANU-PF constantly tried to impose its supremacy which it showed for example in the violent 
dealing with the crisis in Matabeleland in the mid-1980. The crisis ended with the 
incorporation of the PF- ZAPU into ZANU-PF (Muzondidya 2009: 179-181). 
Up to the 1990s the Zimbabwean government had a good reputation abroad but as the internal 
social problems grew, especially with the implementation of the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ESAP), so did the international scepticism (Muzondidya 2009: 188). 
In the following years it became obvious that the project of creating “a just, equitable and non-
racial society” would not be accomplished and that there were no foundations laid to establish 
a democratic order (Muzondidya 2009: 199). In the late 1990s deficits in creating economic 
equality and building up a state with political diversity led to the “Crisis in Zimbabwe” 
(Raftopoulos 2009: 201). According to Sachikonye:  
 
“The erosion of the erstwhile substantial political base of the ZANU-
PF party which had ruled from 1980 must be sought in its poor record 
in addressing the multiple crisis described above. Incompetence and 
mismanagement contributed to the crisis” (Sachikonye 2002: 15). 
 
 3.3 Main Actors  
The main actors in relation to civil society can arguably be said to be the ruling party, ZANU-
PF and the main oppositional party that came out of civil society, the MDC. In the following 
sections we shall briefly account for each of these two actor’s emergence and role in society, in 
order to create a better foundation for understanding the environment where the Zimbabwean 
civil society acts in.     
 
3.3.1 ZANU-PF 
 
At the end of the 1950s the anti-colonial struggle in Rhodesia gained followers and was 
influenced by the independence of other African countries like Ghana or Kenya. In 1960 an 
African Nationalist Party by the name of the National Democratic Party (NDP) was 
established. The party more or less replaced the banned African National Council (ANC) and 
quickly attracted support. The party’s activities, like the organisation of nationwide protests 
and its militancy, resulted in its ban in 1961. This event led to the formation of the Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (ZAPU) that due to the weakness of its leader Nkomo, split in 1963. 
The new party was named Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Fierce street battles 
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between the supporters gave the government once more an excuse to ban its organisation and 
detain or imprison the leadership (Mlambo 2009: 109-112).  
Since the political struggle did not have the anticipated outcome, the movements turned to 
arms; ZANU formed an armed wing called Zimbabwe African Liberation Army (ZANLA) and 
ZAPU equally formed Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPRA). The following period was marked 
by constantly shifting military and political alliances.  The two nationalist armies trained in 
camps in Tanzania together but soon conflicts broke out. At the same time the political 
leadership impersonated by Nkomo (ZAPU) and Mugabe (ZANU) formed a political alliance 
Patriotic Front (PF) and engaged in talks with the British and Americans (Scholz 2004: 32-36).  
The fractions were in the negotiations at the Lancaster House conference in 1979 as PF united 
but in the following elections in 1980 stood as two different parties at the polls. ZAPU became 
PF-ZAPU and gained 20 (out of 100 seats) and ZANU adopted the name ZANU-PF and 
appointed with 57 seats Robert Mugabe as the first Prime Minister of independent Zimbabwe 
(Mtisi et al. 2009b: 166).  
The rivalry between the two parties persisted until 1987 when the PF-ZAPU was incorporated 
into ZANU-PF after years of violent repression in Matabeleland (Muzondidya 2009: 178). The 
ZANU-PF has been the ruling party of Zimbabwe ever since, basically establishing a one-
party-state, although there is an opposition identifiable, most pronounced in the form of the 
MDC.  
3.3.2 MDC 
 
 
The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) emerged from an alliance between the 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA) in 1999.  
In the early 1980s the government saw the need to gain the support of urban-based classes that 
were formally supporting the ZAPU party, the rival of ZANU-PF. In order to win these classes 
loyalties, ZANU-PF initiated the ZCTU (Raftopoulos 2001: 3).  ZCTU basically became a 
wing of the ruling party but at the end of the 1980s they managed to acquire a more 
autonomous and criticising position towards the state. At the extraordinary congress in 1988, 
ZANU-PF for the first time became aware of the danger that the union posed to its rule. The 
declining economy and the imposed ESAP lead in the following years to severe strikes and 
attempts by the government to limit the union’s power (Masunungure 2004: 169f.).  
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The ZCTU initially focussed on economic matters, however, it was eventually decided that 
they needed to extent the political vision and broaden the outreach.  To accomplish these tasks 
it played a key role in establishing the NCA (National Constitutional Assembly)8 in 1998. The 
main focus of the NCA was on drawing attention to a constitutional reform and therefore, they 
had a more political agenda than the ZCTU (Raftopopoulos 2009: 206).  
The alliance between the ZCTU and NCA, visible in Morgan Tsvangirai being the ZCTU 
Secretary General and NCA chairman, put the organisations in the strategic position to form 
and lead opposition politics.  On 11th September 1999 the MDC was formed and started to gain 
supporters, especially in the former ZANU-PF dominated rural areas. In the referendum in 
February 2000 the opposition campaigned against the new constitution and ZANU-PF was 
clearly defeated for the first time in twenty years. The party-state responded immediately with 
violent land invasions and propaganda assaults against the MDC and its allies (Masunungure 
2004: 175-177). 
In the parliamentary elections in 2005 MDC lost 16 seats to ZANU-PF, leaving ZANU-PF 
with two thirds majority and the right to unilaterally change the constitution. Meanwhile, the 
MDC was torn by internal struggles over who should be in power. Eventually, more  
disagreements  resulted in the splitting of the party, with Tsvangirai still being in charge of one 
faction, the MDC-T, and with Arthur Mutambara, a student activist from the 1980s being in 
charge of the other faction, MDC - M (Zeilig 2010). There were several attempts made to 
reunite the two fractions but until this day this was not successfully accomplished. This is said 
to weaken the opposition and making it easier for Mugabe to stay in power (New Zimbabwe 
2010). 
The elections in 2008 represented the so far biggest threat to ZANU-PF. According to their 
own calculations, Tsvangirai got 50.3 percent of the votes as compared to Mugabe’s 43.8 
percent in the presidential polls. The events following the election were characterized by 
repression of MDC supporters with almost 100 supporters and members being killed and 
thousands driven from their homes. These events made the MDC withdraw instead of standing 
up defending their results (Zeilig 2010). Consequently, the presidential election became an 
indication of the power of ZANU-PF. However, in February 2009 the new Government of 
National Unity (GNU) was set down, featuring among others, Tsvangirai as prime minister.  
 
                                                           
8
 We are going to discuss the NCA in detail in section 6.2.1. 
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  3.4 Part Conclusion 
As the above sections pointed out, ZANU-PF is the governing force that formed a one-party 
state since it came to power in 1980. On this background, it has been able to consolidate and 
establish its power. Since the 1990s however, there has been an increasing criticism of the 
regime that led to the establishment of the MDC by the civil society organizations ZCTU and 
NCA. Until this day the MDC is the dominating oppositional party in Zimbabwe.  
4. Civil Society Theory 
 
Though known for centuries, especially since the end of the cold war the concept of civil 
society has gained widespread popularity and has as such been widely applied, theoretically as 
well as practically. All around the globe the concept has been praised for its invaluable positive 
contribution to promoting development and democracy (e.g. Edwards 2009;Kasfir 1998; 
Howell & Pearce 2001). The increased recognition and use of the concept has also led to still 
more uncertainties and disagreements of the meaning as well as the value of the term. To some, 
this has had positive effects: According to Howell and Pearce 
“the constant slippage between civil society as a normative concept 
and civil society as an empirical reality conceals the intense, ongoing 
debate about its meaning and enables donors to fund “civil society” as 
if it was a given” (Howell & Pearce 2001: 2). 
 
 Meanwhile, the criticism is widespread. In 1997 Bebbington and Riddell note that “civil 
society is a notoriously slippery term [...] it is used in different ways by different people and 
those uses are not always consistent” (Bebbington & Riddell 1997: 108-109). This description 
is supported by Michael Edwards who describes the concept as “a chicken soup of social 
sciences” (Edwards 2009: 3) and Van Roy, who classifies civil society as an ‘analytical hat-
stand’, indicating that the concept is so broad that it can be used to express almost any idea or 
believe of politics, society, citizenship, organizations etc. (Lewis 2001: 1-3). 
As the above illustrates, the lack of consensus, uncertainties and debates are prevalent. Some of 
the current main issues of the debates count what the relationship between civil society and the 
state is and what it should be? Furthermore, it is discussed whether civil society is a solely 
western term that can only be applied in a western context or, if it is relevant in other contexts, 
e.g. in Sub- Saharan Africa.   
We will now go through the history of the concept to become more familiar with the term, by 
tracing the first ideas of the concept and to see the context in which they were shaped. On this 
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background we will elaborate on the current ideas and the controversies, specifically in relation 
to whether the concept of civil society is applicable in Africa. 
 
4.1 History of the Concept of Civil Society 
 
In overall terms, it can be argued that the concept of civil society has gone through three main 
phases. Originally. it was discovered during European enlightenment, and then, got massive 
influence through thinkers in the 19th and 20th century. For a period, civil society was forgotten, 
until it was reinvented by scholars who used it to describe and explain the Eastern and Central 
European anti-authoritarian struggles in the late 1980s (Lewis 2001: 4). We will now briefly go 
through each of the three phases in more detail. 
In the first phase, the beginning of the 18th century, civil society was developed along with the 
formulation of the idea and purpose of the state, by western political philosophers, most 
notably Hobbes and Locke. To them civil society was understood as the characteristics of a 
society that was no longer in the state of nature.  Thus, the focus was not on the civil society as 
the opposition to a given political order, the state; but rather civil society was the defining 
characteristic of a society with a given political order (Harbeson 1994: 2; Matanga 2002: 3).  
As from the second phase from the 19th century, civil society started to be understood as the 
‘something’ that was in between private property and the state. Hereby civil society was no 
longer part of the state (Matanga 2002: 3; Chabal & Daloz 1999: 17).  Hegel, Tocqueville and 
Gramsci were all among the frontrunners in the formulation of the modern version of the 
concept of civil society, defining civil society in relation to the state. But there were certain 
differences in how this relationship was conceived. For Hegel, civil society was not necessarily 
to be trusted; he saw it as  the responsibility of the state to monitor, control and balance civil 
society, in order to ensure that civil society would actually contribute to the ´common good` 
(Lewis 2001: 1). De Tocqueville’s writings are perhaps more characterizing for the period and 
must be understood in the context of industrialization and meanwhile the establishment of 
governmental structures. With economy as well as the states expanding, there was a need for 
something to balance it and to defend the citizens of e.g. despotic government, which resulted 
in a number of associations emerging. As such, the state was understood to be the catalyst of 
civil society groups, yet the task of the associations was to counterweight it. In addition, they 
were supposed to promote a democratic culture and make the basis for reforms to avoid 
revolutions. Through these considerations De Tocqueville proposed that democracy is 
strengthened from associations in that the associations encapsulate active citizenship (Whaites 
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1998: 3; Lewis 2001: 2; Howell & Pearce 2001: 42-46).  Gramsci understood civil society as 
an arena, separate from the state, within which ideological hegemony was being challenged, 
hereby implying that conflict between state and civil society was inevitable (Helsinki Institute 
for International Development 1995; Lewis 2001: 2-3; Edwards 2009: 8-9).  
The third phase of the history of civil society started in the late 1980s and continued 
throughout the 1990s as the concept gained new popularity. This revival of the concept of civil 
society has been widely interpreted, in turn, as a response to the recently experienced 
shortcomings of the state and the success of the market. Throughout the 1970s skepticism 
towards the state grew, in a developmental context specifically with the increasing insight in 
the failure of majority of African states abilities to promote sustainable growth and 
development. In the 1980s the international recession and debt crisis seriously challenged the 
faith in the developmental state and the state began to look more like the problem than the 
solution. On this background came the new agenda of neoliberalism.  The end of the cold war 
marked the victory of the battle between state and market; and freedom of the market was 
transferred to the freedom of citizens thus making liberal democracy the one and only desirable 
form of political system (Howell and Pearce 2001: 3-5; 14-15). On top of these developments 
and commonly agreed lessons learned, civil society came as a neat theoretical explanation to 
the events in Eastern and Central Europe, with the breakdown of the authoritarian communist 
regimes of the Soviet Union that was essentially understood to be driven by strong, 
confrontational and antiauthoritarian civil societies.  Together, these circumstances led to a 
widespread conception from liberal democratic scholars that civil society is the foundation of 
democracy, in that it can stand up against the state and secure values such as human rights, 
freedom, antistatism etc. As such, the common normative perception was that civil society 
would always be composed by the ‘good guys’ and the good guys would always be progressive 
and necessarily contributing to democracy. Besides, civil society was seen as the one neutral 
part, with no particular interests on its own (Matanga 2002; Edwards 2009: Howell & Pearce 
2001).  
This line of events and the conclusions drawn had immediate policy implications. From the 
events in Eastern and Central Europe it seemed obvious that a strong civil society would be the 
primary solution in order to deal with authoritarian states, – also in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Matanga 2002: 5). Not only was civil society seen as the solution to fight authoritarian 
regimes. To top it, it would be the key to deal with the tyrannical markets and states as such, in 
reducing poverty etc. Hence, Jeremy Rifkin labeled civil society as “our last, best hope” 
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(Edwards 2009: 3), while the fathers of the ‘third way’ Anthony Giddens and Benjamin Barber 
saw civil society as the missing link between state and market that would finally secure the 
success of social democracy in the global north. In development policies the result was that 
supposedly neutral civil society actors became the preferred local partners instead of the state 
and the building and supporting of civil society became a crucial part of the ‘good governance’ 
agenda that reigned throughout the 1990s9 (Lewis 2001: 3; Edwards 2009).  
 
4.2 Current Debates 
The debates within the current literature of civil society are somehow spin offs to these 
different conceptualizations of civil society. In order to account for the current perceptions of 
civil society in more detail and with more perspective, we shall now look into the questions of 
who civil society is, what the relation to the state is and should be and how civil society has 
been used in development policies. Finally, we will use these perspectives to look into the 
ideas and debates of civil society in Africa.   
 
4.2.1 Who is Civil Society? 
 
 
It is typically agreed that civil society is something that exceeds the household (Lewis 2001). 
Bratton elaborates on this basic understanding; the description that civil society is beyond the 
household implies that though the interests of participating in a certain organization might be 
private, they are also public in two senses.  First of all, the individuals in spite of their private 
interests meet in the organization to pursue their common goals. Secondly, it is public because 
it happens in the institutional ‘commons’, that is, beyond the household (Bratton 1994: 4).  
Bratton further argues that civil society is also identifiable for being apart from the state and 
not the same thing as a political society. Civil society being apart from the state covers that the 
state as the governing elites are exercising their powers over society, whereas civil society is 
the sphere where citizens either accept or reject the government’s decisions. When they 
consent, civil society is hereby reproducing the hegemony of the existing order. Civil society is 
not the same as a ‘political society’ because political society institutions, unlike civil society, 
explicitly aim at getting state power (Bratton 1994: 4).  
                                                           
9
 This agenda aimed at reducing poverty, promoting more competitive economic markets, strengthening capacity 
of states to increase responsiveness and to impose rule of law and have more democratic institutions, hereunder 
deepening participation in politics (Lewis 2001: 3; Edwards 2009). 
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Scholars like Putnam (1993; 1995) argue that civil society groups are formed across clans, 
kinships and other basic types of loyalties (Lewis 2001), whereas Van Roy defines civil 
society, as being “the population of groups formed for collective purposes primarily outside of 
the state and marketplace”, thus classifying civil society as groups that are not the state and not 
the market. Howell and Pearce suggest to see civil society as an arena within which all sorts of 
debates between all sorts of different actors are taking place, where power relations are 
contested and where ideas for the better society and a hope for change is born (Howell & 
Pearce 2001: 3).   
Diamond finds that civil society organizations differ from other organizations in society on 
four main points. First, the aims of civil society organizations are public rather than private, 
and it is inclusive to the public rather than exclusive. Second, like Bratton, Diamond finds that 
though civil society organizations may try to influence the state and to hold it accountable, it is 
not itself striving to get the control of the state. Third, civil society organizations are pluralistic 
and diverse. Insofar as an organization tries to monopolize civil society by claiming to be the 
legitimate solution for the people they are thus not part of civil society. Fourth, in relation to 
the third characteristic of civil society, this kind of organization does not claim to represent the 
entire set of interest of any individual or a group. It might happen, that civil society 
organizations become drawn into repeatedly politicized across sharp lines of division thus 
contributing to the creation of a polarized society in society of crisis that eventually can mean 
the downfall of an authoritarian regime, but in the long run this kind of politician and 
polarization does not contribute to democracy (Diamond 1999: 222-226).  
 
4.2.2 Civil Society in Relation to the State 
 
 
As appears from the history and these basic understandings of what civil society is, the concept 
has been and is primarily defined in its relation to the state (Howell & Pearce 2001).         
From this idea of civil society and the state being somehow a dichotomy, scholars have 
generally taken two opposite directions. Either civil society has been understood as being in 
opposition to state, with the defining character of civil society being that it is composed by 
those groups that actively balance, confront and oppose the state. Or it has been seen as a 
collaborate partner with the state, being inspired of the reintroduction of corporatism in 
political science theories in 1970s. Increasingly however, still more scholars are starting to 
advocate for describing civil society in a less polarized sense, with confrontation and 
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collaboration representing the poles on a continuum (Helsinki Institute for Development 
Studies 1995: 4-5). 
To Chabal, civil society is: 
“a vast ensemble of constantly changing groups and individuals whose 
common ground is their exclusion from the state, their consciousness 
of their externality and their potential opposition to the state” (Chabal 
1992: 83).  
Makumbe takes this position of civil society a step further in classifying civil society as: 
“an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in 
a complex of non-state activities – economic and cultural production, 
voluntary associations and household life – and who in this way 
preserve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of 
pressures or control of state institutions” (Makumbe 2002).  
Termed differently, to Makumbe civil society consists of a broad sample of organizations, 
whose task is to counterweight the state.      
As mentioned briefly previously, one of the most celebrated qualities of civil society in relation 
to the state is its ability to positively contribute to democracy. Arguably, the most influential 
scholar making the baseline for this relationship is Putnam. In the publication of his famous 
study from respectively north and southern Italy ‘Making democracy work: Civic traditions in 
modern Italy’ Putnam is outlining some of the concrete elements on the relationship between 
active associations, civic engagement and democratic progress. Putnam draws on De 
Tocqueville and more broadly on the literature of civic culture. The main contribution of 
Putnam is that associational life generates social capital10 that ultimately effects on the 
performance of democratic political systems.  In his conclusion Putnam agrees with De 
Tocqueville upon the assumption that vigorous civil societies are not weakening but 
strengthening for democratic governments (Putnam 1993: 182).  To Putnam this is a universal 
claim and the positive effects result equally from bird watching societies, bowling clubs and 
human rights organizations (Putnam 1993; Howell & Pearce 2001: 41-51).  
This line of reasoning has been very influential in e.g. the development policies from the 
World Bank. Overall, the logic put in development terms runs as follows: Democracy is 
strengthened through civil society and civil society is most often operationalized into NGOs.  
In more detail:   
                                                           
10There is no mainstrem agreement on the definition of social capital. To Putnam it is understood as „features of 
social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for 
mutual benefit“ (Putnam 1995: 67).  
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“In the eyes of many donors and recipients, and even of many 
democratic theorists, the idea that civil society is always a positive 
force for democracy, indeed even the most important one, is 
unassailable. An active – ‘vibrant’ is the adjective of choice – civil 
society is both the force that can hold governments accountable and 
the base upon which a truly democratic culture can be built. There 
follows from this assumption the related idea that promoting civil 
society development is key to democracy-building” (Ottoway 2008).   
 
This line of thinking is apparent in the World Bank report from 1989 ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: 
from crisis to sustainable growth’: Economic reforms should go “hand in hand with good 
governance” (World Bank 1989). NGOs should be service providers and should be taking an 
active part in policymaking: “financing NGOs in Africa as potential agents of democracy 
should be at the top of donor agendas in the 1990s” (Fowler 1991).      
Though influential, Putnam has also been widely criticized from scholars stating that the 
reasoning is tautological and claiming that not all organizations have democratic aims. 
Especially in the cases where the aims are explicitly undemocratic, it will not promote 
democracy (Howell & Pearce 2001). This criticism brings a new perspective to the debate of 
who actually constitutes civil society.  If organizations are not putting pressure or control on 
the state, are they then part of civil society? Are they part of civil society, if they do not have a 
democratic agenda? 
Karlström (1999) states that: 
“while some political scientists include virtually all voluntary 
associations in their definition of civil society, the dominant trend 
among Africanists has been to narrow the concept, excluding 
associations that do not engage with the state in ways that enhance 
either the democratic character of governance or the state’s capacity to 
carry out its policies” (Lund 2007: 677-678).  
This tendency has however also been criticized by scholars emphasizing that civil society does 
exist, even when it is not being confrontational but is actually collaborating with the state. 
According to Matanga, civil society and the state can be partners. This has two implications. 
First, it means that the defining character of civil society is not its opposition to the state. 
Second, civil society is not per se a ‘good’ force. Together this is leading to the assumption that 
civil society is civil society, even when it is collaborating with an authoritarian regime 
(Matanga 2002: 2). This group of scholars argues for a more inclusive definition of civil 
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society that opens for the nuances of various civil society groups, representing their own 
interests that they are trying to make the state act according to (Lewis 1992; Matanga 2002: 5).      
Diamond agrees in this position stating that even though a civil society organization fulfills all 
the criteria of being part of civil society that does not necessarily mean that it will promote 
democracy. Civil society organizations might be both undemocratic internally and in its 
relations to the rest of civil society and the state (Diamond 1999: 227-228). He finds that a key 
feature of civil society is its autonomy from the state but adds that the state has the 
responsibility of making civil society work by setting up the legal space for civil society to 
operate. According to Diamond, there should be channels and mechanisms through which the 
population of a country can express their opinions and check the power of the state, at elections 
as well as in between them. These include the rule of law as well as secured freedom rights for 
individuals as well as for groups; the freedom of thought, speech, gathering etc. (Diamond 
1999: 218-222).  
4.2.3 Civil Society in Africa 
 
According to Christian Lund, civil society: 
“seems to be the finest ideological export item that the West can offer 
the rest of the world, in particular in the light of general 
disillusionment with a centralized state. It has almost become a 
Eurocentric index of accomplishment” (Lund 2007: 677).  
This point of view is representative for an increasing number of scholars that have started 
drawing attention to the fact that the notion of civil society is rather ethnocentric, having been 
developed in a specific western context. Hence they started opting for recognizing that 
different communities around the globe might have different types of civil societies and even 
that, in some contexts, the term of civil society may be irrelevant (Howell & Pearce 2001: 5). 
In other words, debates on the applicability of civil society and its respectively analytical, 
theoretical and political value spring from the insight that the western idea of civil society 
might not fit e.g. the African reality. Broadly speaking, the advocates of civil society in Africa 
are mainly amongst the ones already mentioned, focusing on civil society as a political tool to 
promote their normative idea of how to build the ‘good society’ with democracy and 
development. Conversely, the critics mainly argue based on the empirical realities which they 
find are not compatible with the premises of the concept of civil society. Overall, these critics 
can be divided into two main schools, respectively Western Exceptionalism and the Adaptive 
Prescription.    
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4.2.3.1 Western Exceptionalism 
 
Western Exceptionalism is stressing the historically and geographically rareness leading to the 
development of the concept of civil society. On this background their conclusion is that it is not 
relevant in the context of Africa (Lewis 2001). The main point of the criticism of the western 
use is that civil society is an old, western concept that has been reinvented to describe recent 
developments, in a western context. As numerous other concepts that have been developed in 
the west, the mistake is to assume that the concept of civil society is the ideal, not just for the 
west but for any society (Muchie 2002: 10). The bottom line is that the concept has limited 
explanatory power in the context of e.g. Sub Saharan Africa.  
Maina suggests that the problem lies in the fact that the concept fails to grasp the specific 
African context with predatory states, informal associational life and the vital roles played by 
class and ethnicity (Maina 1998: 137).  From the case of Mozambique, Sogge (1997) identifies 
three main reasons for the problems of applying the concept of civil society in Africa. The first 
reason stems from the restrains inherited from the colonial state that was and is still limiting 
the associational space so much that the civil society will never be comparable to the western 
understanding of it. The second reason is said to be the result of the structural adjustment 
programs that have left state legitimacy low as ever and with citizens feeling that power is 
exercised from outside the country, consequently leaving them with little motivation to act. 
Thirdly, it should be noted that public and private action is ambiguous, with informal actions 
being preferred over formal and with associational activities changing constantly in order to 
adjust to the predatory environment (Lewis 2001: 7).      
 
4.2.3.2 Adaptive Prescription 
 
 
According to the thinkers of ‘adaptive prescription’ it is recognized that civil society is a 
western derived concept. Still however, they find that the concept can be developed and 
adjusted and as such, applied in different contexts (Lewis 2001).  
Chabal and Daloz can be classified amongst these scholars. They find that the concept of civil 
society is rather difficult to use in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, the main point being that 
the dichotomy between state and civil society as known from the west is not there in an African 
context. In other words, they agree with the ‘western exceptionalists’ in stating that the western 
premise for western theories on civil society, with a separation between, on one hand, a well-
organized civil society and on the other hand, a somehow autonomous bureaucratic state is not 
in accordance with an African context (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 17).  
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Howell and Pearce are also among the scholars being skeptical towards some of the main 
premises of civil society. According to them, it did make sense in the context in which the 
concept was developed but it does not per se apply to an African context. This means that the 
concept should at least be adjusted to fit the reality before it can have any real value. Among 
the premises making the difference between the context of the west and Africa they identify 
two key concepts; the ‘individual subject’ and ‘civility’.   
First, from the mainstream idea of it, the ‘individual subject’ is one of the basic premises of 
civil society; an individual who is self-determining, being free from kinship and family ties. 
This liberal idea is reflected in the idea of civil society in that it makes civil society a gathering 
of people, not because of family belongings or other ties, but because they as free individuals 
are there to pursue a common goal. Furthermore it implies that civil society is something that 
facilitates the creation of new social bonds. However, the idea is controversial in that the south 
generally is characterized by family and- kinship ties (Howell and Pearce 2001: 18-19). This 
point of view is backed by the Helsinki Institute for Development. They argue that when the 
postcolonial state in its essence is the same as the colonial state, it is not likely that civil society 
organizations will be able to mobilize citizens to voice themselves in politics that goes beyond 
their own personal interests. Essentially, 
“political parties are formed around personalities, which means that at the 
grassroots level they mobilize people according to different loyalties instead 
of political programs or discussion of alternatives to government policy” 
(Helsinki Institute of Development Studies 1995: 7).  
Secondly, Howell and Pearce are pointing out that throughout history the term of ‘civility’ has 
been used to mark the difference between ‘the west and the rest’. Uncivilized people have been 
said to live in societies that are characterized by the absence of an absolute power to control 
them. Conversely, in modern liberty the premise is that civil liberty is secured in a law, in order 
to allow society to develop.  On this background Howell and Pearce argue that civil society 
only makes sense insofar as it is within a regulatory framework that is accepted by the citizens 
as legitimate which is not necessarily the case in Sub-Saharan African countries (Howell & 
Pearce 2001: 20-21).   
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4.2.3.3 A Non-relevant Question 
 
Opposed to this skepticism is a group of scholars, answering the critique by pointing out that 
the question of the relevance is not in itself relevant; civil society has been and is playing a 
major part in Africa (Lewis 2001). Empirically these scholars identify what they describe as an 
“awakening wave of civil society” throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s, which they find is 
a result of poor economic performances of the African states combined with what they label 
“political decay11” (Matanga 2002: 5; Harbeson 1994: 1- 27)   
Mamdani (1996) argues that current blurry perceptions of civil society make it impossible to 
look critically at the African and the European civil societies alike. He shows that the meeting 
between the two back from colonial times: 
“was in reality very ‘uncivil’ and aimed to institutionalize difference 
between groups of citizens and ethicized subjects, and between 
civilized colonists governed by ‘constitutionalism’ and native tribes 
governed by ‘customary law’ (Lewis 2001: 10).  
The main point of Mamdani is that these dichotomies are essentially not beneficial because the 
main task they have is replaying standard dichotomies of e.g. the democracies from the west 
and the colonial systems that were created and enforced in this vein (Lewis 2010).   
4.3 Part Conclusion 
As it appears from the above, the contributions to and the use of the concept of civil society are 
many, and consequently, so are the debates and controversies. However, a mainstream tradition 
of perceiving a relation between civil society and democracy is identifiable. In the coming 
chapter we will use this theoretical outline to assess respectively, the applicability of the 
concept of civil society in Zimbabwe, and presumed link between civil society and democracy 
in relation to two civil society organizations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
11
 Declining competitive party politics, patrimonial regimes, lack of civil liberties etc. (Matanga 2002: 5). 
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5. Analysis: The Applicability of the Concept of Civil Society in Zimbabwe 
 
We shall now have a look at the tendencies in Zimbabwe to see whether and how the 
conceptions of civil society are applicable in this context12. In this chapter we will merely 
focus on the basic elements of what civil society is and in chapter 6 we will get back to the 
question on whether civil society is contributing to democracy. We shall approach the question 
of the applicability first, by providing an overview of the main lines of Zimbabwean actors and 
events that by some scholars are classified as those of civil society. As will be argued, these 
accountings mainly cover actors and events that have been in opposition to the state. Following 
this, we will broaden up the perspective to look at different types of actors that could also be 
said to be part of civil society, though they are not opposing the state. Hereafter, we shall focus 
on some of the points that critics are stating as problematic when applying the concept of civil 
society in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. More specifically, this part will focus on the 
supposed independence between civil society actors and the state that looks rather different in 
the context of Zimbabwe. Finally, we shall sum up by discussing the points from the previous 
sections and the implications for the applicability of the concept of civil society in a 
Zimbabwean context.     
5.1 Zimbabwean Civil Society – Main Lines of the Actors Opposing the State 
 
There are a number of events and tendencies that by scholars are referred to as those of civil 
society. In the following section we shall provide an overview of these actors and events, in 
order to make clear what the reality looks like.    
The Rhodesian colonial state used a system of repression of the African population in order to 
prevent the formation of resistance. For this reason, until 1980 mainly white-run NGOs were 
developed and supported.  They strictly had non-political agendas, like for example burial 
societies or development NGOs as wings of white-led churches. Therefore, few independent 
black leadership in NGOs existed until the 1980s (Moyo et al. 2000: xiii). After independence, 
the civil war in Matabeleland showed that not all parts of the nation state of Zimbabwe were in 
line with ZANU-PF (Dorman 2001: 208).  
                                                           
12
 Throughout this chapter we will be refering to the organizations we mention as ‚civil society organizations‘ 
even though the applicability of the concept of ‚civil society‘ overall is not yet clarified. This choice is based on 
the lack of other precise terminologies for the phenomenon in question.        
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Matyszak argues that the oppositional part of Zimbabwean groups emerged as a response to the 
starting economic crisis throughout the 1990s with ESAP and ESAP II, seriously taking off 
with Mugabe’s unilateral decision to give compensation to the war veterans in 199713 that 
caused a dramatic drop in the value of the Zimbabwean dollar overnight, and was followed up 
by Mugabe’s yet again unilateral decision about the military intervention in Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) (Matyszak 2009: 134). Sachikonye agrees with this perception; he 
finds that the period between 1990 and 1998 was characterized by an expansion of civil society 
organizations both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Among the emerging organizations 
were labor unions, human rights groups and unions of students14 and journalists. Broadly 
speaking their agenda was aiming at promoting their social and economic interests which they 
mainly pursued through broad popular mobilizations (Sachikonye 2009).  
 
However, as the decade went by, authoritarian tendencies became more pronounced. In 
response to the arising dissatisfied civil society the government mobilized the police as well as 
the army with the clear goal of teaching the population a lesson (Matyszak 2009: 134).  
Meanwhile, the opposition parties remained weak, consequently leading to issues relating to 
democracy and human rights becoming the new focus area of civil society. Among the most 
predominant organizations within these fields were the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU)15, Zimbabwean Human Rights Organization (ZimRights)16, the Catholic Commission 
for Justice and Peace (CCJP), the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) - and many others. 
That they were growing in numbers and more significantly in strength and support is prevalent 
in that they managed to organize various strikes, and specifically, that they mobilized and 
successfully got the population to reject the draft constitution at a national referendum in 2000 
(Sachikonye 2002: 16; Zeilig 2010).   
                                                           
13
 We will get back to this point in section 6.2.2.2. 
14
 Students have been very vital in peaceful and violent demonstrations since the late 1980s protests. As a result 
the government tried to gain control over them by the introduction of the University Amendment Act in 1990 that 
effectively made the studying conditions more difficult (Dorman 2001:107f). The University is closed on a regular 
basis, the last time after violent demonstrations in June 2010. The students are organised in the Zimbabwe 
National Students Union (ZINASU) and the Students’ Representative Council (SRC) (of the University of 
Zimbabwe) (Zimbabwe Journalists 2010).  
15
 The ZCTU was formed in 1981 and united the 52 existing labour movements. Today 17 unions are affiliated 
with ZCTU (ZCTU 2010). 
16
 The NGO Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights) was created in 1992 with the aim of informing the 
population and empowering the citizens to defend human rights. Part of their work is also to document human 
rights abuses (Zimrights 2010). When referring to human rights abuses in newspaper articles or official 
government sources like the Human Rights Report of the US Government, Zimrights is often quoted as the source 
of information.  
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These events meant that after 2000 government violence increased yet again, both as a 
response to the loss in the referendum and to the fact that the newborn opposition party, MDC, 
got only five seats less than ZANU-PF in the parliamentary elections (Zeilig 2010). 
Sachikonye explains how the authoritarian tendencies deepen, as the opposition challenge, also 
from civil society, increases:   
 
“Civil liberties and human rights are among the early causalities of 
that response. Press freedom is assaulted […] State media is 
transformed into propaganda machines. Civil society organizations are 
targeted for criticism and threats. Domestic critics are labeled 
'unpatriotic', and foreign critics are lumped together as 'imperialists'. 
An independent judiciary becomes an object of attack. […] the use of 
political terror for electoral advantage was a sad illustration of its [the 
ruling party’s] weakness” (Sachikonye 2002: 18-19).  
 
ZANU-PF furthermore partly succeeded in convincing people domestically and internationally 
that they were the true inheritors of the liberation movement and thus, the most legitimate to 
rule (Zeilig 2010).  
 
This response from ZANU-PF leads Sachikonye to point to the strength of these civil society 
organizations that gained power in the end of the 1990s. Their actions and not the least the 
following response by ZANU-PF clearly illustrates that these civil society organizations 
actually managed to challenge the hegemony of ZANU-PF; it was their pressure alone that got 
the referendum up – and rejected (Sachikonye 2009: 6).  Zeilig agrees in the strength of these 
civil society organizations. He proposes that the main efforts to make a serious opposition to 
the ruling party also after 2000 did not come from the opposition party MDC but from civil 
society organizations that started taking center stage. Specifically, he points out an 
organization like WOZA17 (Zeilig 2010).    
 
As argued in the overview of the history of civil society, the concept has primarily been 
defined in relation to the state. From the above accountings, it makes sense to acknowledge 
that there are groups and organizations in Zimbabwe that are not (entirely) part of the state, 
                                                           
17
 WOZA was founded in 2003 and are currently representing over 75 000 members of both genders. Their 
mission is to make the demands of women heard (lobbyism), to empower female leadership and to stand up for 
women’s rights and freedom. As a consequence they are aiming at a non-violent strategy in order to achieve better 
governance and social justice. In August 2006 was the MOZA (Men of Zimbabwe Arise) formed and the 
associations have been closely working together since (WOZA 2010).  
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some of them actively opposing the government and some perceived by ZANU-PF as 
opponents. As a consequence there are parts of society that are operating in a sphere that has 
no clear cut boarders but is not incorporated into the state either. Hereby they make a good 
candidate to have the label of actually being civil society. At least from the perspective of the 
scholars stating that civil society are those actors that are opposing the state.  
However, to this finding must be added more points. First of all, the organizations opposing the 
state are not the only organizations there can be identified in the context of Zimbabwean civil 
society.  Secondly, from the critics introduced in section 4.2.3 we know that theoretically 
speaking not all find that the concept of civil society is applicable in the context of Africa.  
 
5.2 Bringing in More Actors 
 
From a basic understanding of it, civil society is merely the phenomenon of what is beyond the 
household and outside the state. The actors that are actively opposing the state as just outlined 
are not the only ones that can be identified in this space in the case of Zimbabwe. In several of 
these cases, the relationship to the state is more broad, and complicated, than simply opposing 
the state. In the current section we shall elaborate on this by introducing some of these other 
types of actors.  
For example, the traditional chiefs in Zimbabwe could be understood to be operating in this 
space although the Council of Chiefs is also represented in the senate.18 When the legitimacy 
of the ZANU-PF became threatened they built alliances with the traditional chiefs and 
introduced the Traditional Leaders Act (1998) which increased the power of the chiefs. Chiefs 
are now supposed to be in charge of the land and its distribution and they preside over minor 
crimes like theft etc. (Muzondidya 2009: 198f.).  
As 90 percent of the Zimbabwean population is Christian (CIA Factbook 2010), the churches 
have had and still have an important say in the Zimbabwean society. The part played by the 
Churches organizations is being perceived as ambiguous because of their attempts to avoid 
criticizing the government and their building up alliances with the state (Muzondidya 2009: 
                                                           
18Although the notion “traditional” can because of the historical past and the use of “indirect rule” be misleading  
The British colonial governments often created new „chiefdoms” for example to indirectly rule over segmentairy 
societies or imposed chiefs on people that were not traditionally legitimate. Indirect rule destroyed furthermore 
lots of the traditional checks and balances that were in place to ensure “good governance” and the legitimacy of 
the chief. As a consequence the chiefs were often accountable to the colonial administration only and could 
become despotic rulers.  Although one has to notice that that was not the general rule. 
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195f.) The two most important Christian umbrella organisations count the Zimbabwe Christian 
Alliance19 (CA or ZCA) and the Zimbabwe Council of Churches20 (ZCC).  
Another interesting and rather ambiguous case is that of the ZCTU; the umbrella organisation 
of all labour unions mentioned in section 3.3.2. At its creation, the labour movement was seen 
as a wing of ZANU-PF but over time it has managed to become more autonomous while 
developing a critical approach towards the government, which is e.g. visible in the fact that the 
ZCTU is a founding member of the opposition party MDC (Masunungure 2004: 169f.). 
A group within the Zimbabwean society that is often mentioned and critically discussed is the 
war veterans with their two main organisations ZNLWVA and Zimbabwe Liberators' Platform 
ZLP. The war veterans organizations were initially created as military wings to respectively 
ZANU-PF and ZAPU before independence, and has after independence not quite lost their 
close relationship to ZANU-PF (Kriger 2003: 324). We will discuss this specific case in more 
details in section 6.2.2.   
From the above it should be clear that there are several types of organizations existing in a 
sphere that can be described as “not being the state” and “beyond the household”, though they 
are not all characterized by being directly confrontational or opposing towards the state. What 
they all do have in common, besides from being in this certain sphere, is that they are 
representing a pluralism of organizations each with a different purpose and in each of them, 
with individuals participating on a voluntary basis. Due to these characteristics, two lessons 
can be pointed out. First of all, in the context of Zimbabwe it makes no sense to talk about a 
civil society that is neutral, like it is supposed to be according to mainstream scholars. The 
reality seems to be more like that put forward by Howell and Pearce or Matanga, where it is 
claimed that civil society is an arena in where a plurality of different opinions etc. are being 
discussed, hereby stressing the need for a broad understanding of what constitutes civil society. 
Secondly, because these organizations exist and are composed by volunteers at least to some 
extent, theoretically they are all holding the potential of creating what denoted by Putnam is 
                                                           
19
 CA is a Christian national network of organizations that stands up for justice and peace in Zimbabwe and has 
played a key role in launching the “Save Zimbabwe Campaign” in 2006 (ZCA 2010). 
20
 The ZCC has existed since 1964 and includes Christian groups and organisations (ZCC 2010).  
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called ‘social capital`. In other words, it seems that there is something that can be included in 
and explained by at least some versions of the concept of civil society.  
 
5.3 The Relation to the State 
  
The criticism that it makes no sense to apply the civil society concept in non-western contexts 
has to be seen in close relation to state-society relations. Since the dichotomy between the state 
and civil society is developed according to the historic circumstances in Europe, this may be 
exactly where the problem when dealing with the civil society in Zimbabwe lies. According to 
e.g. Bratton, the state is an immense part of the explanation of the performance of civil society 
(Bratton 1994: 4). In the current section we will address the relationship between the 
Zimbabwean state and the organizations mentioned above.   
 
5.3.1 Strategy of the State 
 
 
Since there is an authoritarian regime in power in Zimbabwe, the circumstances in which the 
different civil society organizations are acting, are more than difficult, and cannot easily be 
compared to other contexts. In overall terms, as put by Sachikonye, authoritarianism is 
characterized by patronage as well as by coercion; the state uses coercion to monopolize power 
while doing all within this power to resist democratization from below, e.g. by repressing civil 
society organization that might not approve of the undemocratic regime (Sachikonye 2009: 4). 
We will now look into the nature of the Zimbabwean state in more details. 
The colonial authorities limited the development of a civil society by aiming at avoiding the 
black population from participating in politics and society. The reason for that was that they 
feared resistance to their European minority ruling over the African majority. In order to 
accomplish their mission they created a clear distinction between the African population being 
tribal and native “subjects” under “customary law”, and the rest of the population holding the 
full citizenship and rights (Mamdani 1996: 16ff).  
Unlike expected and hoped for, the situation did not change significantly in the post- 
independence era (ibid.). Conversely, ZANU-PF took advantage of the vaguely developed civil 
society among the black population and defined themselves as the legitimate voice of the 
population. According to Moyo, they defined themselves to be the umbrella organization of all 
social movements that fitted into their definition of legitimacy (Moyo 1993: 7-9).   Mamdani 
argues on post-colonial states in general that ZANU-PF basically took over a state that was 
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built to exclude certain people from rule or, to put it in other words, was characterized by 
having a despotic minority that was ruling over the majority. He then states that the 
consequence of this takeover was that it was bound to become despotic again at some point, 
because the structure of power was not entirely reformed (Mamdani 1996: 26).  
To be a little more specific on this development, it should be stressed that the parties that took 
over in Zimbabwe in 1980 were shaped by 17 years of liberation war. The measures taken to 
ensure discipline in the guerrilla armies, closely connected to the parties, were repressive and 
authoritarian. In addition, the parties were used to dealing with their enemies21 in violent ways. 
Adding to that mixture were the Marxist-Leninist principles that ZANU-PF adopted and which 
resulted in aiming to build hegemony or, in other words, a one-party-state. In order to 
accomplish that objective, a real or perceived well-organized opposition, is a serious threat. 
This was dealt with by trying to apply the   “divide and rule” concept that also the British and 
later on Rhodesians in Zimbabwe used. ZANU-PF has simply tried to divide the “enemies” in 
order to weaken them.22 The quest for hegemony led to a professional subordination in the 
bureaucracy of the state, meaning that slowly but surely ZANU-PF could not be distinguished 
from the state anymore. Furthermore the party is until the present day still dominating the 
structures of the state (Masunungure 2004: 148-152). This specific nature of the state has had a 
number of consequences for the emergence as well as the nature of civil society in Zimbabwe.    
 
Within this framework of ZANU-PF’s fear of losing its power, the political culture is marked 
by repression and the use of violence. As already noted in section 5.1, the opposition as well as 
the organizations aiming at opposing the state are being terrorized by the government and its 
allies; more concretely the police, the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) and the war 
veterans. It seems that the organizations of Zimbabwe are either in alliance with ZANU-PF or 
marked as against it hereby earning the label “enemy”. As examples of this can be mentioned 
the case of the allied war veterans association for whom the government has actually opened 
up space to act in.23 Conversely, the opposition and perceived opposition “must be swallowed, 
infiltrated, manipulated and controlled at all times” (Masunungure 2004: 149). 
As a result the civil society associations have to act in a restricted framework and sometimes 
life threatening conditions. The sphere of activity for NGOs in Zimbabwe is even more limited 
                                                           
21
 The repressive Rhodesian state and the competing parties and their guerrilla wings.  
22
 This would be very much in the line with Mamdani theories about the “bifuricated state” (Mamdani 1996: 16).  
23As already noted, we will return to the case of the war veterans in further details in section 6.2.2.  
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since the government reintroduced the Private Voluntary Organisations Act (PVO) in 2002. On 
account of the Act, NGOs have to register at the ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, some 
are not supposed to get foreign funding and a PVO Board was created that has far-reaching 
power to investigate NGO activities and finances. In addition to that, the freedom of assembly 
is limited due to the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) (Jensen 2010: 12f.). The NGO bill 
from 2005 that was an inch from being law further illustrates the thin line of where civil 
society organizations are balancing. This law would have made it illegal for them to engage in 
questions regarding the government or democracy, and would further have restricted the 
funding options so that it would only have been legal to receive foreign funding when 
approved by the government (Zeilig 2010). According to Dadirai Chikwengo this bill is still at 
Mugabe’s desk, used frequently to pose threats towards civil society (Chikwengo 9.12.2010).        
 
Summing up, in Zimbabwe the state provides a much narrower space for civil society to act in 
than in other (especially western) countries. As such, it can hardly be considered valid to 
assume that the state is fulfilling the responsibilities it has according to e.g. Diamond; that is, to 
provide the space for civil society to act, by ensuring the rule of law, freedom of speech etc.     
 
What should be noted, is that the government strategies have not been constant but hav both 
been changing over time and towards different organizations. In some rare cases it has even 
been opening the space to act in. For example, the period up to the 2008 elections was 
characterized by a remarkable opening of the political space from the government. The typical 
immense levels of violence were not reached, the MDC was allowed to campaign, even in rural 
areas typical regarded ZANU-PF zones, and they were also permitted to put some campaign 
material in the state controlled media (Matyszak 2009: 138).24   
 
5.3.2 Strategy of Civil Society Organizations 
  
The changing strategies of the authoritarian state had immense implications for the 
Zimbabwean civil society organizations, establishing the foundation for the “to engage or not 
engage with the state” dilemma, as presented in the title of this paper and in the introduction. 
More specifically, the civil society organizations have been divided on the matter of how to 
cope in this environment and have clearly pursued different strategies. In overall terms it can 
                                                           
24According to Matyszak, the reason for opening the space should be found in the South African led negotiations 
between ZANU PF and the MDC, where it is reckoned that Thabo Mbeki has convinced Mugabe that the only 
way to start dealing with the crisis was for regional as well as international partners to conceive the election to be 
free and fair (Matyszak 2009: 138).     
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be claimed that civil society organisations could have three positions in relation to the state. 
Since ZANU-PF polarized the relationship between the state and civil society, the 
organizations have either been allying with the state, declared an “enemy”, or tried to stay 
neutral as long as possible. Neither of these choices or positions have necessarily been 
constant.  
 
Cooperating with the state has been an attractive option for many organisations. In the case of 
the war veterans for example it made (state) resources and financial and logistical support 
accessible, and concretely resulted in for example access to certain jobs or land. However, the 
organizations that preferred not to ally with ZANU-PF, like the NCA, were labelled as 
opposing the Zimbabwean unity in general and to be ‘foreign-funded puppets’ of Britain 
(Dorman 2003: 195-214). Certain organizations however did manage to survive the years of 
repression while being critical towards the regime and defending the space for an autonomous 
civil society; these include some of those already mentioned in section 5.1, like WOZA and the 
NCA. WOZA e.g. clearly stayed in opposition by arguing that 
 
“Our mandate is to conduct peaceful protests in defiance of unjust law that 
sanction our fundamental and God-given freedoms of assembly, expression 
and association” (Zeilig 2010).   
 
This kind of organizations has been relying on funding from outside donors and most probably 
the Diaspora, which has on the one hand been providing them with more autonomy from the 
authoritarian state and, on the other hand, made them more dependent on the demands of the 
donors and their aims (Makumbe et al 2000). Some organisations tried to stay neutral by 
explicitly stating that there were not pursuing political interests. For example, in its first years 
of existence, the NCA managed to create the first platform that opened up the space for certain 
political debates or public criticism that was not possible before. Despite ZANU-PFs fear of 
potential opposition forces, this was made possible through the strategy of picking the 
constitution as their central starting point. That way the government was not directly criticised, 
and the broad outreach programme could be carried out which encouraged debates and public 
participation (Dorman 2003: 195; 209). However, staying neutral only seems to work for a 
certain period of time; eventually the organisation somehow has to choose or is forced to take 
sides, either because the regime, their members or other organisations from within civil society 
are making them. In the case of the NCA this point was reached when the government formed 
the Constitutional Commission. That way NCA was forced to participate in formulating a new 
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constitution under the leading role of ZANU-PF or oppose the process which was understood 
by the government as opposing them. 
 
5.3.3 Reflections on the Relations between the State and Civil Society 
 
 
As it appears from the above and in line with Edwards, the basic element facilitating the 
development of civil society in the context of Zimbabwe does indeed seem to be the state. The 
state is most clearly not providing the ideal space for civil society to act in, and consequently, 
the actors of civil society have to prioritise and make up strategies for creating a space for 
themselves as exemplified in the above. The state can thus be said to set the limits for how 
much civil society can develop.  The question is now, if these peculiar circumstances should 
simply make one to disqualify the analytical value of the concept of civil society in this 
context?   
According to Chabal the answer would be a clear ‘no’. He argues that the analysis and 
thorough understanding of postcolonial Africa requires a look into the “interaction between 
state and civil society” (Chabal 1992: 82) because this interaction is of utmost importance even 
when the focus is merely on understanding the postcolonial state itself (ibid.). Basically, 
Chabal is assuming that it is the relation between civil society and the state that determines the 
effect of the policies in post-colonial Africa. He argues that what matters in a postcolonial 
African context is civil societies’ part in the construction of the state (Chabal 1992: 82-97). 
This point of Chabal arguably can be traced back to the Hobbesian idea, that civil society is 
merely the defining character of a society within a given political order. It follows from these 
perspectives that dismissal of the applicability of the concept of civil society in the 
Zimbabwean context would basically mean, that the point of the Zimbabwean state would be 
missed.    
 
5.4 Part Conclusion 
 
From the above sections it is obvious to see how civil society organizations are choosing their 
strategies from the premises provided by the state. This implies that the two actors are by no 
means autonomous or independent from each other. Rather they seem mutually dependent, 
with the actions of one actor leading to immediate responses from the other; there seems to be 
a constant process of adjusting. Furthermore, the state is not providing the space that it should 
according to e.g. Diamond. In these aspects, the circumstances of Zimbabwe are not similar to 
the premises of mainstream civil society theories.  
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More inputs could be added to this argument. Due to the authors of this paper not conducting 
field research it is difficult to assume in which way the liberal idea of an “individual subject” 
exists in Zimbabwe. From the way that Mugabe is referring to ethnic groups in the national 
discourse, we assume that these are what play the most important role in the everyday 
Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the distinction between civil and uncivil that Howell and Pearce are 
pointing out, is not implementable in Zimbabwe because the society is controlled by a 
centralized power which is not accepted as legitimate by the majority of the people (Howell & 
Pearce 2001: 20-21). 
In spite of these above described lacks of similarities, this does not necessarily mean that the 
concept of civil society has no value in a context like the Zimbabwean. It should be taken into 
account that by simply dismissing the whole civil society concept for these reasons, one fails to 
acknowledge that there is something existing in Zimbabwe that definitely is beyond the 
household, and yet, that cannot be labelled as directly being the state.   
The group of Zimbabwean actors introduced in this chapter is not a unified, homogenous 
group; rather they have very different interests, agendas, projects and strategies that change 
over time according to the changing circumstances. Some have specific political strategies and 
others do not.  Some are allying with the state and others are not. Acknowledging these 
characteristics, we suggest that Matanga’s understanding of civil society encapsulates the 
Zimbabwean context; he understands civil society as a broad group of various actors that are 
representing their own interests; hence the defining character of civil society is not necessarily 
its opposition to the state. Accordingly, we find that the concept of civil society is applicable in 
Zimbabwe if civil society is seen as a constant process, with ongoing negotiations, alliances 
and clashes between different groups that are not per se neutral.  
We find that it is useful to apply the concept, because it allows us to shed light on the 
similarities and differences in the relationships between civil society actors and the state that 
provides insights into the Zimbabwean society. In line with Mamdani, Chabal and Lewis we 
argue that civil society, exactly in the form it has in a certain context brings explanatory value 
to the specific case. The concept allows us to study the processes of social change. The civil 
society organizations mentioned are all adding to and being part of these processes and as such, 
the concept of civil society allows one to look at the possibilities of social change around 
context and time. Therefore, though there might be incongruence between some of the main 
premises that western scholars have suggested for civil society and the African reality on the 
ground, this should not simply lead to a complete dismissal of the applicability of concept. 
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Rather, this seems exactly to be where the real valuable information is hidden, also concerning 
variations around the globe. 
What should be noted though, is that as the premises differ across context, so do the 
possibilities, the types, the strategies and the actions taken on by civil society actors.  
Accordingly, the expectations to, and normative ideas of, civil society organizations should be 
adjusted.  
 
6. Analysis: Civil Society Promoting Democracy? 
 
“Common elements in the civil society discourse are a critique of state 
domination of public life, a preference for reform over revolution, and 
a strategy for political change based upon negotiations and elections. 
Since this discourse has emerged in African countries, we must now 
ask: Is there a civil society in Africa? What role, if any, can it play in 
democratization?” (Bratton 1994: 1).  
 
As argued in the previous chapter and to answer the first part of Bratton’s question, we do find 
that a civil society is identifiable in the context of Zimbabwe. This finding however, does not 
equal that civil society is or will be promoting democracy inevitably. In the following chapter 
we shall examine further the supposed link between civil society and the promotion of 
democracy in the context of Zimbabwe. We shall do so, first by outlining again the essence of 
presumed link as it is presented theoretically. Then we shall have a look at two cases, 
respectively the NCA and the war veterans Association, the ZNLVWA. Both cases are, as will 
be argued, fulfilling the most basic requirements to be civil society organizations, however, 
they do vary in the extent to which they are promoting democracy. The differences between 
them, is argued to be representative between the two poles of civil society organizations that 
Zimbabwe arguably consists of. Thus, these cases lead to the question of whether it makes 
sense to talk about a per se relation between civil society and democracy.  
 
 
6.1 Theoretical Considerations 
 
As mentioned in chapter 4, Putnam was among the first scholars to point to a presumed link 
between civil society and democratization. The point of Putnam is rather broad. Through 
associationalism, social capital which is promoting democracy will emerge. Since then this link 
seems to have become an implicit truth, with relatively little emphasis on how exactly the 
mechanisms work (Howell & Pearce 2001).  In this vein Bratton poses the question, how 
exactly it is that the institutions of civil society are promoting democracy. Answering that, he is 
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using a list provided by the USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation 
(CDIE) that mentions three main qualities of civil society that make them capable of promoting 
democracy. First, civil action widens participation, as marginalized groups get mobilized into 
public life. Second, the institutions of civil society protect the citizens against excesses of state 
power and third, civil society helps to guarantee political accountability because they do 
communication, representation and negotiation which ensures that the citizen’s inputs are being 
heard and acted upon (Bratton 1994: 9). 
 
The second and third criteria are slightly more specific and demanding than those posed by e.g. 
Putnam. According to these it is not merely about being associated but also about having 
certain agendas such as protecting the citizens from state power and communicating their 
coordinated inputs on how they find that a society should be. This is more than can be said of 
what is likely to be the result of Putnam’s bird watching society where the requirements to the 
activities are less specific.    
Edwards brings an anecdote about a Putnam presentation at Harvard, where he is discussing the 
links and qualities of associationalism, social capital and democracy, by drawing on the 
example of choirs. Suddenly he is interrupted by a person in the audience asking; “But Bob, 
what is the choir singing” (Edwards 2009: 51). This question stresses the point that we are 
aiming at, namely that there is no guarantee that civil society will actually manage to promote 
democracy. Though the choir members are certainly participating in civil society, creating trust 
and civicness, they might not promote democracy if the texts of the songs are nondemocratic 
propaganda (Edwards 2009: 42-62).         
To go back to the USAID criteria presented by Bratton; while the Zimbabwean civil society in 
some sense indeed is identifiable as concluded in chapter 5, this does not necessarily mean that 
all actors of civil society will fulfill these above criteria 
 
 
6.2 Cases – the NCA and the ZNLVWA 
 
 
In the following sections we shall now be looking into the cases of the NCA and the ZNLWVA 
to see whether and how it makes sense to talk about their promotion of democracy.   
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6.2.1 The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) 
 
 
The NCA makes an excellent case of an organization that is aiming at promoting democracy.  
6.2.1.1 Introduction 
 
 
The National constitutional Assembly (NCA) was founded by an initiative of the Council of 
Zimbabwean Churches in 1998 and is comprised of ethnical diverse organisations as well as 
individuals, more specifically 
 “a diversity of civic organisations, professional associations, 
churches, trade unions, student organisations, human rights groups, 
and other groups and individuals, particularly intellectuals and 
journalists” (Masunungure 2004: 173; Sithole 2001).  
The organizational structure of the NCA reflects their efforts of trying to express the voice of 
the people. They have their Headquarter in Harare and in addition to that they have regional 
representatives in each of Zimbabwe’s ten provinces. The constitutive organ is the national 
assembly that meets three times a year to set the general policy framework for the organization. 
Beneath the national assembly is the National Taskforce which is responsible for the 
implementation of the policy framework from the National Assembly. They generally meet 
once a month. Daily administration and supervision of the regional representatives is done by a 
full time secretariat located in Harare. On a more concrete executive level, the NCA has 
various issue specific taskforces that also are telling of the areas on which the NCA focuses. 
The task forces counts for example an advocacy committee, a gender committee and a legal 
committee (ncazimbawe 2010; Sithole 2001: 162). 
 
6.2.1.2 Democracy Promotion 
 
The NCA relies on funding from external donors such as HIVOS Foundation (Netherlands), 
USAID (United States), DANIDA (Denmark) and SIDA in Sweden (Lumina 2009; Sithole 
2010: 162).  The Western donations appear as clear reflections of the opinion and the position 
the NCA has taken towards the ruling party. To get more specific, the founding of the NCA 
can be understood as the response and fear from some part of the population to what 
throughout the 1990s looked like an “inexorable course toward authoritarianism and one-party 
dominance” (Sithole 2001: 161).  This fear led various civil society organizations to initiate 
open meetings where they would discuss the challenges of the government’s still more 
excessive power and yet decreased institutional capacity to ensure accountability. The process 
was finalized with the recommendation of crafting a new constitution in order to ensure better 
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governance. This recommendation represented the initiation of the NCA (Sithole 2001). As 
such, NCA is a single issue organization, with the main focus on promoting a constitutional 
reform that is supposed to lead to democracy, good governance and therefore social and 
economic prosperity (Masunungure 2004: 173; Matyszak 2009: 137). 
The NCA has indeed lived almost punctually up to all three USAID criteria of how civil 
society organizations can promote democracy. Not only have they had masses of the 
population mobilized. In addition, they are explicitly aiming at guarding the population against 
the excesses of state power and they are succeeding in having the voice of people heard by the 
government. These direct focus areas had an impact, though initially ZANU-PF was not taking 
the emergence of the NCA seriously, describing them as 
“a small grouping of individuals sitting under a tree thinking they can 
come up with a constitution for Zimbabwe” (Sithole 2001: 163).  
 
However, by the end of 1998 it was no longer possible for ZANU-PF to dismiss the broad 
popular demand for a new constitution. The immediate response was that ZANU-PF set down a 
constitutional commission with four hundred members whose task it became to draft a new 
constitution. Mugabe used the rhetoric of NCA when encouraging the commission to start with 
a review of the current commission, and then, giving the people of Zimbabwe the opportunity 
to write the new one, “enshrining freedom, democracy, transparency, and good governance” 
(ibid.). In order to make the constitution reflect the peoples demands, the commission was to do 
public hearings nationally, get feedback orally and written and by all means collect evidence, 
so that the new constitution could be submitted to a national referendum (ibid.).  
 
Hereby, the ZANU-PF seized to please the masses, but this did make the NCA quiet. From the 
initiation of it the NCA was criticizing the process; the methods through which the constitution 
was set in motion, the ways of appointing members, the lack of transparency and the haste in 
which the process was launched. Furthermore, the NCA claimed that the commission was not 
representing the diversity of the population as the core of the commission consisted of the 
parliament that was dominated by ZANU-PF. While different private and civil society interests 
got involved too, the general tendency was that it would only be actors who were in favor of 
the ruling party. As such, the NCA opted for setting down an independent constitution 
committee, and as that turned out unsuccessfully, they campaigned for people to turn the 
rewritten constitution down in the national referendum. Their claim was that the flawed process 
could only lead to a flawed constitution; a constitution that would not succeed in representing 
the demands of the population (Masunungure 2004). 
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The effort turned out to be worthwhile. On the first national referendum since independence in 
February 2000, the Zimbabwean population turned down the constitution, 44 percent being in favor of 
the constitution, but 53 percent against it. According to a public opinion poll25 almost half of the 
respondents explained their ‘no’ with the fact, that they felt that the new constitution did not reflect 
the inputs of the people. This can e.g. be seen in one clear concern from the majority that appeared in 
the reports from the Constitutional Commission as well as from the opinion poll, namely, that people 
wanted the period of presidency significantly reduced. Regrettably, that was not included in the draft 
constitution (Sithole 2001: 163-164). 
 
 
6.2.1.3 The NCA and the MDC  
 
 
In September 1999 the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) founded the party, the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) together with the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade 
Unions (ZTCU). While creating the party the organization also kept its civil society 
organization alive.  
The party formation caused some debates on how the relationship between the civil society 
organization and the party should be related, clearly illustrating the dilemma of engaging or not 
engaging with the state, yet also underlining at least part of the NCAs members will of being an 
independent democracy promoting ‘watchdog’.   
Already at the formation of the MDC the important question was whether the leadership of the 
party could retain its leadership in both organizations that – if the leadership remained the NCA 
would not be able to keep some of its key persons, amongst these one of the founding 
members, Tsvangirai. In spite of this apparent loss for the NCA, the idea with shared leadership 
was firmly rejected. For the time being, the NCA decided that they did not want to be too 
closely affiliated with a party (Sithole 2001: 165).  
This decision however, did not result in a settled consensus on the question of the relationship 
to the MDC; other issues caused bigger disagreements in the MDC’s first years of living. The 
NCA was torn internally on how exactly to shape the relationship to the party. One wing 
argued that the two should be totally independent; once MDC would succeed in getting into 
parliament while being affiliated with the NCA, the NCA’s credibility as being a watchdog 
would be seriously comprised. The other and stronger wing, pointed that while MDC was still 
                                                           
25
 Conducted by the independent ’Mass Public Opinion Institute’. 
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young and facing the circumstances set up by the ruling party, they would need all the support 
they could get. This wing was the dominant one which is also reflected in that the NCA from 
2000 and onwards has encouraged their members to vote for the MDC (Matyszak 2009: 137).   
Since these initial debates, the general stand that NCA has towards the MDC has seemingly 
become more skeptical. Although the NCA leadership has encouraged their members to vote 
for the MDC, they remain skeptical towards political change through elections. More 
specifically, from the political situation their main argument is that Mugabe in the position of 
the president holds too much power. This includes his (and ZANU-PFs) influence on the 
electoral process and on the police, army and intelligence service which has the consequence 
that civil society is not protected from harassment. The implications towards the MDC are 
basically, that the NCA does not trust the party to act democratically in such a framework, even 
if Mugabe was removed and another party became in charge (Matyszak 2009: 137). As a result, 
10 years after the first constitutional protest, in 2010, the disputes about a constitution are yet 
again rolling and this time the NCA has seemingly distanced itself further from the MDC, at 
least in certain areas. The NCA is arguing against a new constitution commission consisting of 
the two ruling parties, ZANU-PF and MDC. According to them, 
 “A process led by politicians will reflect the short-term selfish 
interests of both ZANU-PF and MDC. So we want a truly people-
driven process that can stand the test of time” (Ngwenya 2010).  
In this vein, the NCA is current launching a ‘Take Charge’ campaign under the motto “We The 
People Shall Write Our Own Constitution” (Take Charge Zimbabwe 2010).  
In an evaluation conducted by Norad it is concluded that the main perception of NCA in 
Zimbabwe is that it has been contributing to raising public awareness of human rights issues in 
relation to the constitution, and that it is considered a relevant actor in a constitutional reform 
process. Furthermore, many respondents expressed that they felt that NCA could play a part as 
an independent ‘watchdog’. The report obviously has a certain donor bias, which makes it more 
interesting to look into the challenges they are identifying.  The evaluation points to two main 
concerns; first of all the NCA advocacy strategy has apparently not been satisfactorily adjusted 
according to the new circumstances, the GNU. Hence it is claimed that NCA is not taking 
proper advantage of the possibilities to participate constructively in the current process of 
constitution making. Secondly, NCA is by some perceived to be the project of its leader, 
making it appear as an undemocratic, not transparent organization, which is challenging the 
NCAs credibility in the population (Lumina 2009).  
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These concerns from some parts of the Zimbabwean population show that the picture of the 
NCA might not be as idyllic and unproblematic, as it has been painted so far and certainly 
provides an interesting basis for further investigations. Nevertheless, the case of the NCA does 
seemingly make a clear cut example of a civil society organization whose explicit aim it is to 
promote democracy through simply working for a new constitution, and who to some extends 
are succeeding in doing so. Furthermore, they are managing to engage broad segments of the 
Zimbabwean population, hereby arguably also strengthening a democratic culture. The internal 
debates in the NCA stresses that it is as an organization which is very self-conscious about its 
role as opponents and ‘watchdogs’ to the  according to them, not democratic state. 
Furthermore, the case  illustrates that there can be different interests represented even in the 
same organization, as it is clear in the different opinions towards the relationship to the MDC.     
The bottom line is that the NCA has an explicit democratic agenda and can hence be said to be 
a democratic force in Zimbabwe. The question is now, if an explicit agenda is needed in order 
to promote democracy? In next section we shall be looking into the case of the war veterans; a 
case where the issue of democracy is not spelled out on the top of their agenda.  
 
6.2.2 The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association – ZNLWVA 
 
 
The biggest war veterans associations, the ZNLWVA, illustrates a case of a civil society 
organization that has, at least partly, chosen the strategy of corporation with the state, and 
whose contribution to democratization has to be questioned. 
 
6.2.2.1 Background 
 
 
The war veterans are the remaining product of the military wings from ZANU-PF and ZAPU 
that existed prior to independence.  The background of their formation is vital to understand in 
order to grasp the current goals, acts and loyalties of the war veterans.   
After their bans in 1964, ZANU-PF and the ZAPU formed military wings (Mlambo 2009: 
111f.). ZANU-PF founded the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and 
ZAPU formed the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) (Kriger 2003: xv). 
Although there are different estimates of numbers, it can be assumed that ZANLA had far more 
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troops that ZIPRA.26 All in all, the two movements are supposed to have had 65 000 guerrillas 
in 1980 (Kriger 2003: 23f.). 
Even at the formation of the two armies prior to independence, ZANLA and ZIPRA were 
divided by pursuing different strategies depending on their foreign supporters. ZANLA, as 
being assisted by China, pursued creating a grass-root party infrastructure through political 
mobilisation. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union supported ZIPRA focused on building up an army 
and in addition guerrilla units (ibid.). There were more important differences between the two 
groups, stemming from their recruitment from different ethnic groups and regions27, and also, 
because conflicts between the two parties could spread into the armies. An incident showing 
this in a very violent way was the massacre in shared training camps in Tanzania.28 
Furthermore, there were clashes and competition between guerrillas and their leaders on a 
regular basis. The mass of the guerrillas was heterogeneous and groups within the movements 
pursued different interests in for example leadership struggles (Kriger 2003: 24-28). An 
example of such a struggle was for example a declaration signed in a ZANLA camp in 
Tanzania that stated that 43 guerrilla ZANLA leaders accepted Mugabe as the only middleman 
between the Rhodesian government and them and welcomed him as their political leader. 
Similar events took place in ZIPRA quarters as well and shifting alliances with different actors 
occurred. An additional problem for the political leadership was to control the guerrillas 
especially in regards to their relationship to civilians which was also due to their indiscipline 
(Kriger 2003: 24-28). 
Overcoming their differences the political leadership of  ZAPU and ZANU-PF formed a 
political alliance (Patriotic Front, PF) and engaged in talks with the British and Americans in 
1979. However, the parties stood separately in the following elections that marked Zimbabwe’s 
independence in 1980, resulting in ZANU-PF winning the majority of the seats and Mugabe 
becoming the Prime Minister (Mtisi et al. 2009b: 165f.). In the changed environment efforts 
were made to integrate the two guerrilla movements and the Rhodesian army but from the 
                                                           
26
 Sources about ZIPRA estimate the number of combatants at 10 000 -12 000 whereas an additional 2 000 were 
placed in Rhodesia, others calculate the amount of liberation fighters at 18 100 in Zambia, 2 900 in Rhodesia, 5 
000 under training in Angola and Zambia plus 1000 combats attending courses in Russia (by 1979). Accounts for 
ZANLA troops suggest that in 1978 the overall amount for guerrillas was around 40 000 with 13 000 being based 
in Rhodesia. A second source states the number for 1979 to be around 13 500 with 9 500 being in Rhodesia and 12 
000 in training in countries like Libya, Ethiopia or Tanzania. In contrast to that there is also the estimate of 30 000 
fighters in 1980 (Kriger 2003: 23f.). 
27
 ZANLA was mostly consiting of Shona speaking fighters whereas ZIPRA mainly recruited from Ndebele and 
Kalanga speaking groups. For more in depth information, refer to Kriger 2003: 24. 
28
 In 1976 broke in a shared camp in Tanzania fighting out between ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas with the result 
that numerous ZIPRA fighters were massacred (Kriger 2003: 25). 
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beginning ZANU-PF’s former guerrilla force ZANLA was favoured in many ways. In the 
subsequent years it proved to be a difficult task to control the former liberation fighters and 
high levels of violence against civilians and sometimes government agents or even the police 
occurred (Kriger 2003: 29). 
The rivalry of the two dominant parties and between ZANLA and ZIPRA was shown in 
Matabeleland in the period before and after the 1985 parliamentary elections when ZANU (PF) 
unleashed with the 5th Brigade a violent campaign. This brigade was led and consisted mainly 
of former ZANLA guerrillas that with government approval tracked down ex ZIPRA-guerillas, 
ZAPU officials and all Ndebele speaking persons that were supposed to be supporting 
dissidents. As a result the 5th Brigade 
“has been held responsible for most atrocities of this period. These 
include thousands of deaths – 2,000 civilian deaths in six weeks alone 
in 1983 – mass beatings, disappearances, mass detentions, torture at 
camps, and rapes. These atrocities far exceed the extremely brutal 
murders, rapes, and robberies committed by the dissidents” (Kriger 
2003: 31).  
The consequence of this campaign and the detention of ZAPU and former ZIPRA leaders, was 
that both parties signed an agreement on unity in 1987 that incorporated ZAPU into ZANU-PF 
(ibid.). A year later the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) 
was created that was supposed to represent the former guerrilla fighters (of ZIPRA and 
ZANLA) interests (Sodoma & Andrew 2006: 2f.). With these actions the two guerrilla groups 
were theoretically combined and formed one group in civil society but this also meant that 
within this formation strongly opposing fractions existed.29  
 
6.2.2.2 Democracy promotion? 
 
 
The perception that civil society organisations are per se promoting democracy seems to be 
seriously challenged by the actions of the ZNLWVA and allied partners. In fact it appears to 
work the opposite way; some war veterans of the ZNLWVA seem responsible for human rights 
violations including murder, rape and torture. On top of that, the ZNLWVA do not aim at 
deepening participation in politics and democratic values or favour the change from a one-party 
state to a multi-party democracy with free and fair elections. Instead, they are promoting 
                                                           
29
 As noted in chapter 2, a fraction of the War Veterans broke loose in 2000 and created the ZLP. For the reasons 
outlined then, they will not directly be the subject of analysis, all though their emergence and agenda will be used 
frequently to discuss the position of the ZNLWVA. This also means that we will be using the terms of ZNLWVA 
and ‘war veterans’ interchanging to describe the main war veterans association.        
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ZANU-PF in public and are actively helping them to stay in power by terrorizing the 
opposition and civilians. Not even internally can the war veterans, as ex-combats, be said to 
have been underpinning democratic values among their members from a democratic, 
participatory structure. Quite oppositely, their structure reflects their past with authoritarian 
militarism being the dominating feature (Masunungure 2004: 150). As a result, the mainstream 
thesis that civil society organisations are per se progressive, promoting democracy or 
democratic values is not obvious in this case.  
The non-democratic agenda and the strong ties to ZANU-PF are for example apparent in 2000 
when ZANU-PF was defeated in a referendum and had to create a new strategy to stay in 
power. The government tried to shift the national focus away from their inability to govern to 
the land question and called for a “Third Chimurenga”. The rhetoric was changed to war 
vocabulary and war veterans were depicted as the liberators of the country. Part of this strategy 
was also the land occupations that started again in 2000.  This time the war veterans30 took the 
leading role and organized the occupations. ZANU-PF provided the lists with farms to be 
occupied that were owned by whites and farm workers which were associated with the 
opposition, but the war veterans also allied with local chiefs and politicians. In addition, the 
party, the CIO and the police arranged logistical and financial support for the war veterans. 
That included a state funded “campaign” that allowed the war veterans to deploy violence 
against opposition supporters all over Zimbabwe. However, they also supported ZANU-PF in 
justifying and defending the occupations in public (Alexander 2006: 185f.). 
It has so far proved impossible to find a first-hand data on the actual vision and objectives of 
the ZNLWVA, besides from them wanting to represent simply, the interests of the war 
veterans.  However, indication of what their objectives are not can be found in the ZLP 
breakaway in 2000 and their reasons for doing so. In the Standard, the breakaway is portrayed 
to be a consequence of the ZNLWVA allying with Mugabe and the ZANU-PF in 2000. The 
ZLP strongly condemned the violence committed by ZNLWVA in support of ZANU-PFs “pre- 
election campaigns”. ZLP is explicitly stating that the aim of the liberation war was to end the 
despotic white rule and that ZNLWVA therefore is not living up to their former standards at 
all. According to the ZLP, this loss of the objectives means that the ZNLWVA is constantly 
undermining their own legitimacy, which the ZLP is therefore claiming (The Standard 2008).  
                                                           
30
 From this point on (after 2000) we use the term „war veterans“ in order to refer to members of the  ZNLWVA. 
We are aware of the fact that not all war veterans are in line with ZNLWVAs and that a number is opposing the 
use of violence.  
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In the email correspondence with our anonymous source we asked if there we could access 
something like a constitutional document on the ZNLWVA. The response to that should of 
course be seen as just one side of the story, however, it does point toward certain tendencies, 
also in the development of the ZNLWVA from its creation and till 2010. To be specific, the 
source stated that a document with the visions of ZNLWVA would not be of much use or of 
any relevance because the organization no longer bases its actions on the original ZNLWVA 
objectives. Our source suggests that the ZNLWVA has become militia and ‘shock troops’ of 
the ZANU-PF, which is not in accordance with their Constitution that apparently should be 
stressing the ZNLWVA as being a non-partisan welfare organization. Finally, it was pointed 
out that many of the war veteran leaders are being rewarded by the leadership of ZANU-PF 
(Anonymous 2010).  Summing up, as already mentioned in chapter 2, the ZLP distance 
themselves from the ZNLWVA by stating that their aim is the democratization of Zimbabwe; 
an aim that they do not find that the ZNLWVA are promoting. 
Altogether, the above does obviously does not mean that the ZNLWVA through their mere 
existence as an institution working for the promotion of a certain group in the plural 
Zimbabwean society’s interests are not promoting democracy. However, it hardly seems likely. 
Conversely, from one aim of the other, the actions of the war veterans seem more than anything 
to actively and directly disrupt the democratization of the Zimbabwean society. 
 
 
6.2.2.3 War Veterans = Civil Society? 
 
  
The above accountings, leads one to question whether it is even justified to talk about the war 
veterans as being part of civil society, with them being so far from the ideas and goals of what 
civil society is supposed to do?  
That the guerrilla armies were the product of political parties, explicitly aimed at being their 
military wings, obviously poses a challenge. Being this closely allied with parties is definitely 
testing the boundaries of the typical idea of civil society, for example from Diamond’s point 
that a key component of civil society is its autonomy from the state and that the civil society 
organizations in contradiction to parties are not seizing to take over the state. In addition, 
Gramsci’s opinion that civil society is an arena which is separate from the state challenging the 
hegemony of the existing order does not seem to be applicable in this context. Yet on the other 
hand, it could be argued that the guerrillas before the independence belonged to civil society 
given their ‘Tocquevillian’ aim of counterweighing the despotic settler state which excluded 
them from participation.  
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Though the above might make a valid point for the settler state period, it does not change the 
fact that in the post-independence era, a rather tight non-autonomous relationship between the 
ZNLWVA and ZANU-PF existed.  This however, is not as simple as it might have appeared till 
now; in order to get the full picture it has to be taken into account that ZNLWVA all along has 
been competing with the state and ZANU-PF in matters of power and influence. From the start, 
ZANU-PF and their guerrillas were in competition with each other; from the beginning one of 
the most characteristic features of the relationship between ZANU- PF and their (former) 
guerrilla armies was the ambivalence. Both groups were in need of and, simultaneously, in 
competition with each other. ZANU-PF and the war veterans tried to establish themselves in 
(key) positions in the army, the civil service and the private sector that were formerly 
dominated by whites. In that scramble for power31 ZANLA war veterans was sanctioned for 
crimes, but the old ties between the party and their former guerrillas were still in existence. 
More importantly, ZANU-PF tried to build its legitimacy on the liberation war fought by the 
favoured ZANLA. At the end of the 1980s ZANU-(PF) had established its power in the state 
and its bureaucracy. The war veterans did not pose a serious threat to the government’s 
legitimacy which was far too consolidated (Kriger 2003: 4). Nevertheless the government tried 
to restrict their influence for example by imposing a ZANU–PF leadership in the ZNLWVA 
(Muzondidya 2009: 197f.).   
A consequence of this is, it should be acknowledged that although the war veterans had gained 
privileged access to state resources, they felt victimized, discriminated against and neglected by 
the government and society as a whole (Kriger 2003: 4). For that reason they demanded 
financial compensation for their involvement in the liberation war in a strategically well-timed 
moment when ZANU-PF’s legitimacy was eroding by the end of the 1990s. The governments’ 
response was generous and exceeded the demands of the war veterans. With a declining 
economy and a growing opposition to the government, ZANU-PF was in need of an ally that 
could legitimize and consolidate their rule (Muzondidya 2009: 197f.).  
The above illustrates a point also put forward by Kriger; that the war veterans and ZANU-PF 
legitimized each other’s existence by drawing on the liberation struggle and the alliance. Still, 
the partnership remained an ambiguous one where both parts tried to manipulate the other part 
in order to gain more influence or resources (Kriger 2003b: 323). But what are the implications 
                                                           
31
 1980-1987. 
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of this ambiguous relationship for whether a case like the ZNLWVA should be included in the 
concept of civil society?  
First of all, the ambiguous relationship puts attention to the fact, that unlike ZANU-PF, the 
ZNLWVA has not been striving to get the power over the state; rather they are merely trying to 
look out for their own interests in society. Secondly, as we have already been excluding the 
scholars stressing the notion of civil society as a neutral, homogenous group, we again turn to 
the civil society theorists pointing to civil society being characterized of pluralism. These 
theorists perceive civil society as consisting of various different groups that pursue diverse 
interests with regards to the state but also with regards to other civil society organisations and 
actors altogether. Not even the members in these organisations are belonging to one 
homogenous group and they are also driven by certain benefits. From this understanding of it, 
the ZNLWVA obviously qualify as civil society. Specifically, according to Matanga’s theory 
on the relation between the state and civil society the ZNLWVA should be considered as part 
of civil society. As already outlined, Matanga puts forward the idea that civil society does not 
have to be the opposition to the state. This implies that civil society organizations can build 
alliances to the state while representing its own interests, which seems to apply to the war 
veterans. This case illustrates how the relations between the state and a civil society 
organization can have historical roots going back to the era of the liberation war against the 
settler state; the organization has roots in the form of dependencies and loyalties that are still 
influencing their actions today. Part of that, is a certain political culture within the organization 
that is not favouring democratic values. In the case of the ZNLWVA the historical dimension is 
part of the relationship towards civilians, other civil society groups and opposition parties that 
are often treated violently. It seems that they forgot that they once belonged to a civil society 
movement against a despotic state when they became liberation fighters. 
As should be clear from the above, the ZNLWVA is basically a non-governmental organisation 
that is trying to represent the interests of their members. Hereby they make a contribution to a 
pluralistic civil society. They are doing so in an environment where an authoritarian, 
antagonistic state is setting the premises from where the war veterans, like any other 
organization, have chosen their strategy; in this case to cooperate withit in certain areas. The 
pluralism even in the group of war veterans is among other things shown in decision of 
breaking away of the ZLP, caused by disagreements of the direction the organization to pursue. 
As such, the overall group of war veterans can be seen exactly as a plural group that through 
different means are aiming at promoting their own interests.  Stating that the specific course of 
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the ZNLWVA makes them disqualified as a civil society organization would immediately 
provoke the reasonable question: What else they should be called then? By labelling them as 
“uncivil” society one would not acknowledge the diversity of civil society and the different 
interests involved and therefore cling to an ideal of civil society that might just not exist. Still it 
is dubious to state that the war veterans are promoting democracy, in spite of them having 
members participating and although they are representing a certain interest in society. The 
question is now, what this contradicting conclusion means for the relationship between civil 
society and democracy? We will discuss this question in further depth in the remaining sections 
of this chapter.  
 
 
6.3 Civil society and Democracy: Does it Matter What ‘The Choir is Singing’? 
 
 
From the above sections is has become clear that the NCA is like other organizations from the 
Zimbabwean civil society explicitly have chosen not to engage with the state, as presented in 
chapter 5. Opposite to this stands ZNLAWVA and they do not either represent a single case in 
the Zimbabwean context; as also outlined in chapter 5, some organizations are to a greater or 
lesser extend allying with the state.  
Gyimah-Boadi precisely sums up one of the main points that we derived at in chapter 5. He 
suggests to understand the character of African civil societies from the nature of the African 
states.  In contradiction to what was expected, the African state has been expanding the 
hierarchies and abuses of power in the quest for hegemony. Thus,  
“Civil associations faced a choice: insist on autonomy and suffer 
repression, or allow themselves to be co-opted by and subordinated to 
the state in order to secure inclusion and enjoy patronage” (Gyimah-
Boadi: 3). 
It is this choice that so clearly is illustrated from the cases of the NCA, the ZNLWVA and 
arguably virtually every other civil society organization in the Zimbabwean context.  
What further appears in the Zimbabwean case is that whether a specific civil society 
organization can be said to be promoting democracy or not from for example the USAID’s 
measures of it, is whether they decided to engage with the state or not. This makes the 
Zimbabwean case appear as a special ‘authoritarian’ edition of civil society. The difference 
between the opposition and the ruling party explicitly appears as a difference between 
democratization towards the western understanding of the term and Mugabe’s authoritarian 
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version of democracy.32 This difference also seems to be the main characteristic in every civil 
society organization – they have taken sides; chosen whether they wanted to ally with the state, 
and consequently they are either pro democratization or alternatively, not having the western 
form of democracy on their agenda.    
Theoretically, this does still not exclude the possibility that all types of civil society 
organizations indirectly are promoting democracy from a point of view as represented by 
Putnam; that through participation and associating the famous stock of social capital will be 
created that will strengthen the democratic culture in the country. Put differently, it might not 
matter what the choir is singing, as long as they are just singing.  Our cases, the NCA and the 
ZNLWVA, do represent parts of a plural civil society. Furthermore, their members are 
associated and each organization is relying on participation from their members.  
 Edwards elaborates on this. He does not dismiss that there are connections between 
associationalism and the promotion of the good society, or more specifically, democracy. In 
other words, he argues that the Putnam thesis about civil society generating trust can be true. 
However, at the same time he acknowledges that this connection is ambiguous and that, most 
importantly, it does not come automatically. The ambiguity applies especially for deeply 
divided societies. As put by Edwards,  
“visions of the good society that rest on voluntary action will always 
be built on shaky foundations, if not on shifting sands” (Edwards 
2009: 58).  
In this vein, the vision of associations saving Zimbabwe from authoritarianism must be said to 
be built on even more shaky foundations; first of all because it can be described as a rather 
polarized society, secondly because of the relatively young history of the nation and the 
missing historical foundation for voluntary action as known in western contexts and thirdly, 
due to the current environment in which the civil society organizations are acting, as already 
outlined. 
                                                           
32
 Zimbabwe can be classified as a democracy from a minimalistic understanding of the term, because they at least 
pretend to have free and fair elections. According to Mugabe, what makes his country a democratic one is the 
question of representation; ZANU-PF is the true liberators of the population, thus also the true rulers of the 
country. However, as should be obvious by now, Mugabe’s understanding of democracy is quite far from the 
Western understanding of the term. In a famous anecdote summarizing a conversation between Gadhafi and 
Mugabe, Gadhafi claims that; “your problem, Mugabe, is that you even bother to do the elections” (Chikwengo 
09.12.10). This anecdote should be rather illustrative of the condition of Mugabe’s democracy. 
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Starting from the perception of civil society being heterogeneous, Muchie argues against the 
current mainstream normative understanding of the ‘success’ of civil society. His point is that 
exactly due to the quality of civil society as a heterogeneous group, it makes no sense to use 
general labels to describe it; that goes for classifying it as good, bad, strong, weak, democratic 
or anything else.  On this background he argues that the concept needs to be conceptualized 
before it is possible to talk about civil society as a per se strength and something that should be 
promoted in order to ensure peace, security and stability (Muchie 2002: 3-4). He acknowledges 
the diverse nature and the multiple interests naturally existing in civil society which also opens 
up for the existence of ‘bad guys’. This implies that  
“tied to multiple and conflicting interests, civil society may create 
more hurdles than possibilities for peace and security in Africa” 
(Muchie 2002: 9).  
This seems to be an exact prognosis of the prospects for the diverse and in some cases dubious 
contributions of Zimbabwean civil society to democracy.  It seems vital to acknowledge that 
there are obviously crucial differences in the contexts within which civil societies in different 
countries are operating. In western societies, civil societies might be promoting democracy 
through merely being active, hereby strengthening participation and thus a democratic culture 
in the already consolidated democratic systems. Conversely, in cases like the Zimbabwean the 
task is one of creating a political social system that is not there yet. According to Bratton 
“associational life will be stunted in a context of political violence, in 
the absence of the rule of law, or where essential services are 
intermittent. Networks of public communication cannot develop fully 
unless the state establishes and enforces guarantees of freedom of 
speech. In short, civil society needs an enabling environment of legal 
rights and infrastructural supports. It cannot operate where public 
order or the state is collapsing or operating well below capacity” 
(Bratton 1994: 4).  
This obviously ought to shape different expectations to the type of effort required from civil 
society organizations as well as to the outcome of their work. Putnam’s bird watching society 
might create and even improve participation and active citizenship in established democracies, 
but it will hardly make a change in a context like the Zimbabwean.  
That statement leads towards an answer to the question posted to Putnam in relation to the 
matter of democracy; we do believe that it matters what the choir is singing. Though the NCA 
along with other organizations should be acknowledged for their explicit and dedicated work 
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towards democratization of Zimbabwe, it simply makes no sense to honor the work of the 
ZNLWVA as democracy promoting.   
Saying this, it should be acknowledged that there is a considerate literature, a bunch of policy 
recommendations and a seemingly common agreement on what appears as a per se relationship 
between civil society and democracy. This acknowledgement calls for a rhetorical return to the 
question on whether the ‘bad guys’ should be included in the concept of civil society. 
Returning to our conclusions from chapter 5 the Zimbabwean civil society is a clear product of 
the state. For analytical reasons, it makes little sense to exclude the ZNLWVA or other non-
democratic ‘bad guys’ from the concept. They and their relationship with the state, perhaps 
more than anything, are offering an insight in the dynamics of the condition and nature of the 
Zimbabwean nation. Valuable analytical knowledge would be lost, insofar as they were 
dismissed due to their apparent co-option in the authoritarian state.   
The answer implies that the suggested association between civil society and democracy should 
be understood more as a vision for the better world than as picture of the reality on the ground. 
If civil society in its basic form is understood as the phenomenon of organizations33 that 
represent and communicate pluralistic interests, beyond the household and outside the state, it 
becomes commonsense that it is a normative simplification to understand civil society through 
homogenous labels and to expect them to pursue the same goals. This becomes extremely 
outspoken in the context of Zimbabwe where an alliance with the state most likely means at 
least implicit support of the authoritarian regime, hereby in some sense making the allying 
organizations obscuring processes of democratization. Consequently, as argued above, civil 
society cannot be seen separate from the state.  
In the light of our conclusions, we shall devote the next section to shedding light on the need for 
differentiation between civil society as vision and as a theoretical tool. 
 
 
6.3.1 Civil society and democracy:  Vision or Reality 
 
 
Howell and Pearce are strongly criticizing that, although a vast amount of work have been 
published, this literature did not help in pointing out why civil society is supposed to be 
essential in development in the South (Howell & Pearce 2001: 17).  
                                                           
33
 As in this case. We acknowledge that  civil society is not limited to organizations in general. 
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One of the main reasons Howell and Pearce identify for the shortcoming is that the concept of 
civil society  
“reflects multiple normative understandings of what ought to be the 
relationship among the individual, the society and the state. It makes 
as little sense to claim one relationship between civil society and 
development as it does to claim that development itself is an 
uncontested end-state of modernization” (Howell & Pearce 2001: 13).   
A number of scholars agree with the problem, arguing that though civil society might be a 
fruitful concept to use for analysis, it does not have any real value as a political concept (e.g. 
Kasfir 1998; Matanga 2002). This seems to be the essence of the deal with the concept of civil 
society; that the theoretical idea of civil society has simply become too entangled with the 
policy recommendations.  The concept of civil society has suffered from being too much of a 
revelation for too many groups – and the enthusiasm is indeed prevalent:  
“Neo-populist development theorists and practitioners extol the virtues 
of grassroots non-governmental organizations...Economic liberals 
[emphasize] how these policies contribute to the emergence of 
business interests to counterbalance and discipline way-ward 
states…Radical socialists zero in on the potential role of social 
organizations...in transforming society“ (White 1996: 180-181). 
As opposed to all these optimists, Howell and Pearce argue that the supposed link between civil 
society and democracy is more of a justification for where development money is going to, that 
has spread into theories, than it is an empirical fact. Consequently, they suggest to reflect upon 
questions like what kind of associations should be supported? Is it the more the better because 
the point is to make room for all citizens with all their different opinions to voice themselves so 
that more associations are meaning more democracy and social capital and growth? Or if it is 
only certain civil society organization with a specific ‘right’ pro democratic aim that should be 
supported (Howell & Pearce 2001: 7)?  
From the above follows, that we suggest to perceive the link between civil society as a 
democracy- and development-promoting force per se as a normative construction rather than an 
empirical reality. The ideas of the link might be confirmed in certain cases where specific 
criteria exist. However, from our studies the link appears as less logical and essential than it is 
often presented.  
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6.4 Part Conclusion 
 
As the two examples of NCA and the war veterans have pointed out, civil society organizations 
may promote democracy but their sheer existence is not necessarily sufficient. First of all, 
groups or organizations are formed in order to represent their member’s interests. If their 
primary aim would be promoting democracy, then civil society would not be pluralistic but a 
homogenous mass with one common aim. Since this is not the case, it is not surprising that the 
interests of the organizations vary and that there are also groups existing, like the war veterans, 
that through their actions appears like an obstacle towards democratization. Their motivation 
need not be explicitly anti-democratic; it merely reflects the fact that, if the opposition would 
actually succeed in winning the power of Zimbabwe, then the ZNLWVA would lose the 
advantages from being allied with ZANU-PF and therefore large amounts of their power and 
legitimacy. Nevertheless, the war veterans have to be considered as part of civil society. As a 
result, the historicity of the civil society organizations is very important to take into 
consideration, especially old and existing ties and shifting alliances. Connected to that is also 
the political culture of the organization and its internal structure that may not promote 
democratic values. When trying to argue for a link between civil society and their organizations 
promoting democracy, these different aspects have to be taken into account before drawing 
overall conclusions.  
 
7. Conclusion 
According to our findings, the concept of civil society can be applied in Zimbabwe and is a 
useful tool to examine processes of social change, although in some aspects, the premises are 
not similar to certain tendencies within mainstream civil society theories. In spite of a difficult 
framework, a range of vital organizations, beyond the household and outside the state, can be 
identified in Zimbabwe. Arguably, the sum of these constitutes a pluralistic civil society. Some 
of the civil society organizations are building alliances with the state, whereas other 
associations of civil society are actively opposing it. The different strategies towards the state 
are reflecting the authoritarian nature of the government that sets the framework and limits for 
the nature and the performance of  civil society. Within this framework, civil society 
organizations do hold the potential to challenge and influence the state; the relations between 
the state and the various civil society organizations are continuously changing, with the act of 
one actor leading to a response from the other.        
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As a consequence, we understand civil society as a constant process, with ongoing negotiations 
and alliances of different groups in and outside the state. This implies that the boundaries 
between the state and civil society are not clear cut and undergo change on a constant basis. 
When applying the concept of civil society in Zimbabwe it should be taken into account that 
civil society groups are pursuing their own interests and therefore cannot be defined by 
homogenous labels. Consequently it cannot be expected that civil society merely consists of 
organizations opposing the state, and neither can it be assumed that they will per se be a 
“good” democracy promoting force.  
The case studies of the NCA and ZNLWVA illustrates exactly the ‘divide and rule’ and 
polarization strategies that the Zimbabwean government is pursuing towards civil society. 
Furthermore, it exemplifies two alternatives to how civil society associations are reacting to 
these strategies. The case of the NCA shows, how an organization of civil society can be 
promoting democracy, through having the explicit aim of democratization, through 
mobilization of severe parts of the population in participatory activities, and through 
successfully putting questions of democratization on the Zimbabwean agenda. Conversely, the 
ZNLWVA case suggests that the normative idea of the relation between civil society and 
democracy ought to be separated from the empirical reality. The ZNLWVA is using violence 
against other parts of civil society and the civil population more broadly; hence, it can hardly 
be justified to claim that they are promoting democracy. Still, the ZNLWVA should be 
considered a civil society organization. As it is characteristic for any other civil society 
organization, the ZNLWV is preoccupied with pursuing their interests in society. What 
separates the ZNLWVA from a case like the NCA is merely that the means they have 
considered the most viable for securing their interests is the active support of the authoritarian 
regime.  
8. Perspectives 
We shall now briefly consider the implications of our conclusions, first in regards to the 
current situation in Zimbabwe, and secondly, in terms of more general policy lessons and 
pointing towards possibilities for future research.    
 
 
 
 
 
-   Civil Society in Zimbabwe: “To Engage or not to Engage With the State”   -  
 
- 60 -  
8.1 Perspectives on Democratization in Zimbabwe anno 2010 
While disappointment of opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai not making it to become 
president, hopes are still comparatively high. After years of authoritarian tendencies getting 
deeper as a response to the oppositional parts of civil society becoming stronger in late 1990s, 
two years after the fatal 2008 elections it seems that the government repression is reduced and 
the room for organization in civil society has become less tight (Zeilig 2010).  It should be 
noted, that the power sharing between the long term rivals Tsvangirai and Mugabe is certainly 
not unproblematic.34 However, e.g. the Afrobarometer survey from 2009 does show how hope 
and trust in democracy has grown again, compared to the past 5 years (Afrobarometer 2009).  
The current situation does aspire to be the crucial possibility for the initiation of turning the 
coin in Zimbabwean post independent development. According to Sachikonye, the odds are 
there, perhaps more than ever before. He finds that the election results, combined with the 
current situation generally and the fact that Mugabe will turn 88 in February 2010, fertilizing 
the soil for the famous WHAM question,35 are all factors suggesting that the hegemony of 
ZANU-PF will be continuously more challenged (Sachikonye 2009). But the question remains: 
will and can these odds be used by oppositional pro-democracy parts of the Zimbabwean civil 
society to push for further democratization? And will it be democratization in the sense where 
it is not just another party that also gets a share of the power, or one, where the system gets 
truly democratic instead of authoritarian (Sachikonye 2009: 7).  
These questions matter, especially in the context of a growing criticism towards the MDC. 
Though it is acknowledged that the situation is changing, the MDC is criticized for not being 
courageous enough to act responsibly to the population by taking proper use of the space that 
they have gained and for not using their power much better than ZANU-PF (e.g. Zimbabwe 
Situation 2009; Zeilig 2010). According to Chikwengo, the only opposition in Zimbabwe is 
currently civil society.36 She states, that the new pact between the Zimbabwean elites is not in 
itself likely to lead to increased democratization, exactly due to the just mentioned opinions 
about the current performance of the MDC. Thus, her prognosis is that the Zimbabwean future 
looks rather gloomy   (Chikwengo 09.12.10). 
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 See for example http://newzimsituation.com/mobile.php?docID=111801 where Tsvangirai in an open letter is 
accusing Mugabe and ZANU PF for deliberately breaking the Power Sharing Agreement by excluding the MDC 
from influence.    
35
 What Happens After Mugabe?  
36
 In line with virtually everybody else, when making this statement, Chikwengo referred to civil society as a 
whole. However, by now it should be clear that from our understanding of it, the civil society that she is referring 
to is merely the parts of civil society having the sharing a state opposing agenda.     
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From this prognosis and the conclusions of our paper, it should be kept in mind, that though the 
pro democratic oppositional part of a civil society indeed can succeed in ‘pushing’, then this 
push will not in itself be able to do the trick.        
8.2 Policy Implications and Further Research 
The above should lead the attention back to the argument, that the framework set by the state is 
crucial to examine, in order to understand the nature of civil society. The Helsinki Institute for 
Development Studies points to empirical evidence suggesting that when focus remains on civil 
society and no one actually looks into the state itself, it is not likely that the result, even of a 
very active civil society, will be democratization (Helsinki Institute for Development Studies 
1995).  
The current normative tendency of perceiving civil society as a per se good force, does not 
stand out as the only normative tendency in theories and policies in the field of development. 
As argued, the idea of civil society as the ‘solution’ was sparked from another prevalent idea, 
namely that of the African states being ‘failed’, playing the part as the bad guy.37 It all appears 
very black and white and has arguably severe implications. When civil society is considered 
the ‘good guy’, they get part of the aid from foreign donors, dedicated to support their fight 
against the ‘bad guy’, the (failed) state. According to Muchie, the donor strategy of picking 
friends and enemies creates the great risk of causing conflicts and tensions rather than building 
collaboration, progress and cohesion (Muchie 2002: 9).  Bratton concludes that the possibility 
of choosing civil society alone is just not an option (Bratton 1994: 4-5). As put beautifully by 
De Tocqueville; “Good neighbors cannot replace good governance” (Edwards 2009: 60).    
On this background we argue that there is a need to critically asses the theories of civil society 
in further detail, in order to divide the normative simplifications, sound as they may be, from 
the objective complexity. Hereby it will be possible to create a baseline for identifying and 
clarifying which criteria should be there in order for civil society organizations to actually be 
able to promote democracy. This would be valuable, not only in the theories, but also in 
development policies. However, before doing so, a starting point ought to be a critical 
reflection upon a third normative idea, that is just as prevalent in the theoretical and political 
field of development; namely the Western ‘truth’ that democracy is the most viable political 
system for all parts of the world.   
                                                           
37
 For more on the normative idea of the failed state, see e.g. Verhoeven 2009.  
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